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Diplomacy has succeeded historical events and industrial revolutions. However, the 
impacts of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) threaten to be more wide-spanning and 
destructive than any other industrial revolution. The study explores the implications of 
4IR on the theory and practice of diplomacy. The study is guided by three research 
questions: how does 4IR impact diplomacy; what technologies trigger a change in 
diplomacy; and do costs act as a barrier to states? Making use of qualitative methods, 
through the exploration of primary and secondary data, the study explores 4IR’s 
implications on diplomacy. The implications are categorized into five pillars which are 
considered integral aspects of diplomatic theory and practice. The pillars are 
communication, interdependence, domestic and international frameworks, new ‘new’ 
diplomacy and diplomatic functions. The study concludes that diplomacy may be 
impacted by 4IR in all five pillars of diplomacy. 4IR may not diminish the practice of 
diplomacy but rather complement it. A highly digitized diplomacy with cyber tools may 
result in a more efficient and effective type of diplomacy. Technologies such as artificial 
intelligence, big data and information and communication technologies are the key 
drivers of change in diplomacy. In addition, costs may act as a barrier to states but 
innovation and skills are equally important. Partnerships and collaborative efforts will be 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
This dissertation aims to explore the effects of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) on 
diplomacy. 4IR is the latest industrial revolution that is geared by highly innovative and 
breakthrough technologies, threatening to impact all spheres of life (Schwab, 2018). 4IR 
may be simply understood as ‘technological-driven change’ which may merge physical, 
digital and biological spheres into one for the advancement of global human development 
(World Economic Forum, 2019). 
Nicolson (1969), describes diplomacy as the ‘management of international relations’ by 
ambassadors and envoys. Graham (2008:117), states that diplomacy is an ‘instrument 
of foreign policy’, assisting diplomats or heads of state in engaging in diplomatic relations 
which may protect, divert or shape their state’s national interests. With time, the actors 
who conduct diplomacy have vastly evolved and Bjola and Kornprobst (2018), state that 
the actors involved in diplomacy include those representing states, multinational 
corporations (MNCs), international organisations and civil society organisations. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, all three definitions will be utilised and diplomacy may 
therefore be considered as the management of international relations whereby the 
representatives of a state, MNC or organisation engage in diplomatic relations to protect, 
divert or shape the national interest of their states and achieve the foreign policy goals 
set out by the state.  
Diplomatic practice has been a key aspect of international relations since the ancient 
Greek era. Over time, diplomacy has proved to be extremely diverse and agile in nature. 
It has endured world wars, industrial revolutions and technological advances. It has not 
succumbed to any major events throughout history but rather evolved through it. Hare 
(2016), describes diplomacy as highly adaptable.  
Diplomacy evolved from low levels of interaction (Eilers, 2006), to becoming a key tool 
of foreign policy (Graham, 2008). Later on, diplomacy came to welcome non-state actors 
following the formation of the League of Nations prompted by Woodrow Wilson 
(Morgenthau, 1945). Otte (2007), reflects on diplomacy’s private setting in previous 
decades. However, it has become more open over time and technology would soon 
become a key tool of diplomatic practice.  Akokpari (2016), highlights the importance of 
negotiation and communication within diplomacy. Communication is made highly 
2 
 
advanced and sophisticated due to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
and other technological advances, this implies that 4IR may have direct and indirect 
implications on the theory and practice of diplomacy. However, 4IR’s implications may 
not be limited to the communication aspect of diplomacy but also other spheres as 
Schwab (2018), suggests that 4IR will impact all spheres of public and private life.  
The use of technology for diplomatic purposes is not new, as Turekian (2018), explores 
the developing strands of economic, innovation and science diplomacy since 2001 due 
to the influence of technology. The integration of technology into diplomatic practice is 
becoming more prominent and almost unavoidable.  
According to Berridge (2015), telephone diplomacy has become increasingly popular as 
telephone lines become secure and cost-efficient. In addition, modern media has offered 
direct communication between citizens and states and has since replaced the use of the 
telegram. Hare (2016), acknowledges that digitisation has diminished the concerns of 
distance that may have previously hampered diplomatic communication.  
Hare (2016), notes that although technology may stimulate international cooperation 
among state and non-state actors to solve global challenges, such as poverty and 
terrorism, there is also an area of major concern: diplomacy becomes more vulnerable 
as the protection and safety of communication technologies and equipment is often 
beyond a state’s control. The accessibility of computer technology is not exclusive to 
state actors, but it is rather available to anyone and may be used in whatever manner an 
individual or group feels necessary. The use by such actors may not reflect the same 
systemic use of the state to positively contribute to a multipolar international society.  
As 4IR is relatively new and remains in its infancy, it remains unknown how exactly it 
may affect diplomacy. Failure to understand the potential implications of 4IR on 
diplomacy would mean that states may not adequately prepare for a new phase of 
diplomacy. This dissertation attempts to understand how diplomacy is implicated by 4IR 
to enable state and non-state actors with the appropriate knowledge and skills to 
embrace 4IR and be able to deal with the challenges that may arise as a result of the 
intersection between the two.  
Five pillars of diplomacy have been identified to explore the potential implications of 4IR 
on diplomacy. These pillars are communication, interdependence, domestic and 
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international frameworks, new ‘new’ diplomacy and diplomatic functions. The selection 
of each pillar is based on the following:  
Communication is driven by technology and therefore, as technology evolves, diplomatic 
communication may simultaneously evolve. Interdependence was selected as a pillar as 
diplomacy has become more multilateral over time and this may be further enhanced as 
4IR makes the world the most interconnected that it has ever been. The pillar of domestic 
and international frameworks attempts to explore the legislation factor that may be 
required as new technologies are implemented into diplomatic practice. A framework is 
necessary to guide the use of such technologies to minimise privacy or security 
breaches. New ‘new’ diplomacy explores the possibility of a new phase of diplomacy, 
building on the themes of old and new diplomacy as 4IR may change diplomatic practice. 
Lastly, the pillar of diplomatic functions attempts to explore the new and diverse functions 
of diplomatic practice as technology may change performance and the nature of 
diplomatic activity.  
4IR is different to previous industrial revolutions due to its consuming nature. Its 
breakthrough technologies are interruptive and may affect every field as Hare (2016), 
highlights that changes in technology and advances are occurring at a rapid pace. 
Therefore, the research is driven by three central questions. First, the research attempts 
to understand how 4IR affects diplomacy, in theory and in practice. Second, the study 
explores the new technologies that may potentially trigger a change in diplomacy. And 
lastly, the study explores if costs may act as a barrier to states in a new digitised 
diplomatic environment. 
1.2 Conceptualisation of terms   
Chapter 2 will provide an in-depth conceptualisation of concepts aligned to the study. 
However, for an understanding of this section, a brief conceptualisation of terms is 
provided below but will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter.  
➢ Artificial Intelligence (AI) − Berger (2019,) states that AI aids  in finding solutions 
in a ‘human-like manner’, with the ability to perform tasks which often a human 
would do with the ability to reason, generalise, uncover meaning and learn from 
past mistakes. Berger further explains machine-learning, also an integral aspect 
of 4IR, which analyses data to reach, almost perfect, conclusions. 
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➢ ICT- is more commonly known as information technology (IT). It consists of a 
merging of communications and telecommunications, further consisting of 
computer software and middleware; and ‘storage and audio-visual systems’ 
enabling users to have access to, store, transfer as well as manipulate information 
(Asafe, 2014:10). 
➢ Internet of Things (IoT) − Chou suggests it introduces a new level of connectivity. 
An extension of the internet (2019:107). It allows for the inclusion of physical and 
digital realms.  
➢ Public diplomacy − may be understood as types of government mechanisms 
utilised by the state to influence public opinion or inform the public or other 
countries on information regarding the state or its agenda (Dinata, 2014:3).  
➢ Big data − according to Mills (2019:9), is large structured or unstructured datasets 
and due to technological advances, its size is continuously changing. Hashem et 
al. (2015) discuss big data as complex, diverse and massive; requiring the 
appropriate analytical tools and technology to ‘capture, process and reveal 
insights in a timely way’. Lastly, big data has been characterised by the three Vs: 
velocity, variety and volume (Chandler, 2015).  
➢ Cyberspace − consists of interconnected dimensions and infrastructure systems 
with the ability of exploiting information, in addition to producing significant 
changes in the quality of lifestyles as we know it (Bancila, 2018:6).  
1.3 Problem statement  
4IR is made up of overwhelming advances in technology which infiltrate diplomatic 
practice. This, however, makes diplomacy vulnerable as Hare (2016), highlights that the 
security of computational technology and equipment utilised for diplomatic practice may 
be out of a state’s control. The protection and security of ICT and other technology is 
rather difficult as the internet provides a borderless and interconnected international 
environment. As highlighted in the introduction, the use of such technologies is not 
exclusive to states and the intentions of other users (non-state actors) may not 
necessarily align with that of a state’s diplomatic objectives.  
4IR may affect diplomatic theory and practice. Diplomacy is known to have two phases, 
old and new diplomacy. Old diplomacy emerged in ancient Greece and continued to 1819 
(Roberts, 2009). The second and last known phase of diplomacy is new diplomacy which 
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emerged in 1919 and is what is commonly referred to in diplomatic practice today 
(Geraud, 1945). The primary difference between old and new diplomacy is the degree of 
openness and the central actors. However, Sending (et al, 2011), state that from the 
1980s to the 1990s, diplomacy experienced a decline. This decline may be as a result of 
a wider spread of actors and technological influence. Perhaps this leaves room for a 
digitised, highly inclusive and diverse phase of diplomacy. However, it remains in 
question if diplomatic actors are prepared for a new phase. These phases of diplomacy 
will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapters.  
In addition, the utilisation of new technologies and a digitised diplomatic practice of 
diplomacy may not be rigidly guided by an international legal framework. While many 
states may have designed a domestic framework that legislates the use of technologies, 
as it stands there is no international framework that speaks to diplomacy and technology 
exclusively. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) of 1961 was drafted 
roughly 60 years ago and has not been updated since. This is problematic as diplomatic 
practice has evolved and evidently integrated new types of diplomacy, such as economic 
diplomacy, science diplomacy and Twitter diplomacy. The VCDR is yet to include such 
sub-themes and digitised elements of diplomatic practice as communication technologies 
may implicate privacy rights of the state, individuals and private corporations.  
Stanzel (2018), raises three areas of concern relevant to this study: first, the introduction 
of new and advanced technologies has the potential to hinder diplomacy or facilitate its 
development. This is dependent on how states integrate such technologies into 
diplomatic practice. Second, the rise of new non-state actors and use of social media 
may affect the legitimacy of the state. This is especially relevant in relation to the 
discussion of sensitive matters by states on social media platforms. And third, diplomatic 
actors and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) at large ought to be agile and resilient. 
Such individuals should have the potential to quickly develop the appropriate knowledge 
and skills geared to harnessing the 4IR in diplomacy. If diplomats fail to equip themselves 
then it may affect their abilities to appropriately persuade policy outcomes in diplomatic 
affairs.  
In exploring potential future trends for diplomacy, Wallerstein (2011), anticipates 
tumultuous global economy and hostile geopolitics due to the influence of new 
technologies and actors. Schwab (2015), warns of the potential widening of inequalities 
among individuals and states due to the integration of 4IR. This raises concern as to how 
diplomatic relations may be affected, potentially creating further divisions and blocks 
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within international relations. The further divide between developed and developing 
nations may provoke an unequal balance of power as some states may have an unlimited 
access to financial and technological resources that may influence their power in the 
international system. 
Due to the relative newness of 4IR, the potential outcomes and effects on diplomacy are 
largely unknown. Therefore, this study comes at the appropriate time. 
1.4 Research questions 
The research will be guided by one overarching question and two sub-questions which 
may assist in establishing the overall impact of the 4IR on diplomacy.  
1.4.1 Main question: 
➢ How does the 4IR affect diplomacy? 
1.4.2 Sub-questions  
➢ What new technologies have been introduced triggering a change in diplomacy? 
➢ Do costs act as a barrier to states? 
1.5 Research objectives  
➢ To establish the practical and theoretical implications of 4IR on diplomacy and how 
states will deal with such implications.  
➢ To investigate the technologies that may impact diplomacy. 
➢ To determine if costs pose a barrier to states in engaging in diplomatic relations in 
the age of 4IR and how to limit such barriers to avoid a significant imbalance of power 
among states.  
1.6 Limitations of the study  
This dissertation explores the implications of 4IR on diplomacy, exclusively. Therefore, 
the study will explore the theoretical nature of diplomacy as influenced by recent 
technological advancements, in addition to practical diplomatic relations.  
The research aims to answer three research questions. The first and main question 
explores how 4IR affects diplomacy. Five pillars of diplomacy are explored to understand 
the implications of 4IR. The pillars are communication, interdependence, domestic and 
international legal frameworks, new ‘new’ diplomacy and diplomatic functions. Due to the 
wide-spanning nature of the study in the exploration of five pillars of diplomacy, the study 
is extremely comprehensive in the respective pillars, but each pillar may not consist of 
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significant depth. However, this may be built on at doctoral level. In addition, as the study 
focuses on five pillars of diplomacy, it may not include other areas that may also be 
implicated in diplomacy such as economic diplomacy or the weaponisation of diplomacy 
as such topics may be a stand-alone study due to its extensive nature.  
The second question explores the technologies that may trigger a change in diplomacy 
and the research explores the central technologies of 4IR, such as AI, big data and ICTs. 
These technologies have acted as the central focus of 4IR and therefore, the research 
fails to consider the implications of other technologies such as augmented reality, 
autonomous robotics, simulation and cloud computing. However, at the time of writing, 
there is very little evidence that any of the excluded technologies have made a significant 
impact on diplomacy thus far.  
The third and final question explores if costs act as a barrier to states. The question is 
dealt with by exploring the potential of a new global order as Schwab (2016a) has 
suggested that 4IR may offer development opportunities in politics, economics and in 
one’s personal life. To answer this question, the study explores literature by respected 
economists, leading financial institutions and international organisations like the World 
Economic Fund (WEF) and United Nations (UN). However, the study does not explore 
specific case studies to deal with this question for two reasons: 1) it is too soon to see 
physical evidence that 4IR allows countries to skip stages of development and 
industrialisation; and 2) there is a lack of literature on the topic in reference to specific 
case studies. Therefore, the study exclusively explores future predictions.  
The study encompasses reviewing the historical evolution of diplomacy to establish how 
it has evolved over time due to various global influences at the time, making reference 
to old diplomacy, new diplomacy and now a newer phase of diplomacy. Furthermore, the 
study then explores how the concept of diplomacy has changed from what it is 
traditionally known for and what the scope of a diplomat now consists of. In addition, the 
research attempts to understand if there is any legislation that guides this newer phase 
of diplomacy. After critically exploring the theoretical aspect of diplomacy, this being the 
five pillars, the research then continues by exploring the practical implications by 
exploring real-life examples. Practical application of the aforementioned pillars is not 
widely illustrated in current diplomatic relations or in the international society. However, 
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some states have highlighted some suggestion that it is progressing in the projected 
directions. 
Due to the nature of this study, the research exclusively explores the relationship 
between 4IR and diplomacy and therefore, the scope of this research does not explore 
other areas of international relations which may potentially be impacted by the 4IR. Other 
areas of impact are believed to be economic development; migration management; and 
national security. The study will not focus on any of the aforementioned areas as each 
area may be an exclusive study on its own and may drive this dissertation away from its 
original purpose of study and therefore fail to answer the stated research questions.  
Lastly, the topic is relatively new and therefore does not consist of a large array of 
academic literature. While there are plenty of academic sources that speak to modern 
diplomacy and 4IR independently, there are limited sources that speak on the topic in 
relation to one another. Therefore, the dissertation consists of a vast array of different 
resources such as academic journals, books, news articles, conference proceedings and 
organisational reports.  
1.7 Significance of the research  
4IR threatens to impact all aspects of public and private life (Schwab, 2018:13). While 
most fields (banking and industries) thought to be impacted have begun exploration on 
just how their sector or field may be affected by 4IR, the implications of diplomacy are 
yet to be explored. The best way to prepare for an industrial revolution is to know exactly 
what it entails and analyse how it may affect a specific field or sector ahead of time. This 
is precisely what this study aims to do. By exploring the possible implications of 4IR on 
diplomacy, diplomatic thinkers; heads of states; and MFAs;; they may be adequately 
equipped with the knowledge and technical capacity to deal with possible challenges of 
4IR and how to improve the nature of diplomacy and diplomatic relations to keep up with 
the international world and technological advances.  
1.8 Literature review  
The literature review aims to explore any existing research on the study at hand. By 
exploring the existing bodies of knowledge relevant to the topic, it may be established 
how this study fills a gap in research. Literature from notable authors, in the respective 
fields of diplomacy, 4IR and science and technology, are explored.  
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4IR has entered with somewhat of a bang. Xu et al., (2018), describe 4IR as the 
movement of citizens between physical and cyber domains through highly advanced and 
connective technologies gearing and influencing human interaction. Levin (2018), 
highlights that 4IR affects multiple fields and virtually all public and private spheres of life. 
It is a transformative process in governments, businesses, society and production. 
Schwab (2017:6), states that revolution means ‘radical change’, highlighting that this is 
not the first revolution that the international society has experienced but clarifies that this 
particular revolution is much larger and more radical than ever before. The author further 
notes that digital technology is not new – computer software, hardware and networks 
have been around since the third revolution – it is only now that such technologies are 
so trailblazing and interconnected, resulting not only in transforming societies, but also 
that of the global economy at large.   
Griffiths and Ooi (2018), state that IoT has endless possibilities, comprising of physical 
objects in conjunction with embedded technology to sense, interact and communicate. 
The application of IoT offers a range of benefits across all fields and sectors, such as: 
time consumption; enhanced and increased learning opportunities; and will be beneficial 
to existing infrastructures.  
Philbeck and Davis (2019), state that the use of low-cost sensors, powerful machine-
learning algorithms and advanced actuators, allow for the seamless convergence of the 
latest technologies and the physical environment; further arguing that 4IR is a driver of 
transformation and transition across all industries. 
Waslo et al., (2017), examine the cyber challenges prompted by 4IR, such as costs of 
maintenance, system complexity and single vendor dependency. The authors further 
highlight that the extreme use and high reliance of the cyber domain may result in cyber 
threats and attacks, suggesting that cybersecurity should become a priority for all.  
According to Buch et al., (2018), there are various advantages to cybersecurity such as: 
the improved response time to cyber threats, improved security in the cyber dimension 
and the protection of systems and networks. Such advantages may prove to be extremely 
beneficial to states in the matter of international relations. However, the study exclusively 
discusses firms and individuals and fails to discuss the benefits states may experience.  
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Diplomacy is believed to be one of the many areas impacted by 4IR. Nicolson (1963:4), 
explains that diplomacy is the ‘management of international relations’ through the method 
of negotiation by ambassadors, envoys or diplomats. Sandre (2015:5), states that in the 
last few centuries, communication has changed tremendously; implying that the 
traditional manner in which conducting diplomacy was previously utilised, terming it the 
‘wax seal’ formal era of communication, should now evolve to remain relevant just as 
intelligence and the military has evolved, too. 
Hare (2016), describes the diplomatic communication that occurs, between societies and 
actors, as constant. In addition, it takes place in different forms and in some instances, it 
may be difficult to identify. 
Berridge (2015), explores how the method of communication has changed since the 
initiation of diplomacy, further emphasising the security risks which ought to be ensured 
with the latest telecommunication developments, although crediting that the latest 
communications have often been to the benefit of diplomacy. 
Graham (2008:119) provides a brief hint at the change in diplomacy due to the rise in 
technology, coining this as digital diplomacy, also as a result of the extensive growth of 
the use of the internet across the world over the last few decades.  
Manor (2017), redefines digital diplomacy as the overall impact of ICT on the practice of 
diplomacy with the use of mobile applications and emails. This may be further prompted 
by the developments in 4IR. According to Riordan (2016), governments have an 
obsession with social media when referring to digital diplomacy. This obsession may 
hinder foreign ministries from focusing on and developing other digital tools that can 
promote a more effective digital diplomacy.  
Bjola and Holmes (2015), highlight that digital diplomacy attempts to achieve a state’s 
foreign policy goals utilising digital tools. However, due to continuous breakthrough 
technologies constantly emerging and the strides made in social media, it is relatively 
difficult for diplomats to strike a balance on the appropriate tools to achieve its diplomatic 
objectives. Bronk (2010:43) explores the implications of digital diplomacy, stating that 
there are unavoidable issues, for instance, the difficulty in transforming digital diplomacy 
into an effective system for policymaking. 
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According to Kai (2019), industrial revolutions have continuously changed the political 
and economic landscapes, changing the way humans ‘perceive, live and act’. The first 
industrial revolution in the 18th century introduced a wave of capitalism, beginning in 
Britain. The electronic age of the 19th century was an age of imperialism. After World 
War II, the information age arose. It was an era led by the birth of computing technology, 
IT and biotechnology. Kai’s sentiments illustrate how industrial revolutions and 
technological innovations have spillover effects on international relations and the global 
economy. Kai’s study falls short as although it explores the international political and 
economic implications of 4IR, it fails to discuss diplomacy.  
Pilegaard (2016), also highlights the interconnected relationship between societal 
practice and technological innovations that evolve simultaneously. Hutchings and Suri 
(2020), describe the rapid evolution of technological innovations as an indefinite driver 
of change regarding the traditional notions of power, influence and communication.  
Behringer (2006) discusses the communications revolution (1760 onwards) as a 
separate entity from industrial revolutions and as a predecessor of the first industrial 
revolution, stating that from 1760 communications infrastructure rose significantly in the 
United States (US). It encompassed the railroad, airplanes, telegraph, radio, and 
telephones. The developments of the communications revolution resulted in a global 
environment that was much more connected than ever before.  
Wriston (1997), explores the technological impact during the third industrial revolution, 
stating that military capabilities, state sovereignty, and the global economy are all areas 
that were implicated, affecting not only how daily jobs are performed but also what those 
jobs entailed. Wriston (1997:174), believes that the ‘information revolution has increased 
the power of individuals and outmoded old hierarchies’ − suggesting how information and 
technology may change the dynamics of international and diplomatic relations at large. 
Ifantis (2011:441), states that the information age expanded propaganda, enhancing the 
mobility and movement of information.  
Faye (2000), predicted the significant influence that advanced technologies would have 
on diplomatic practice, stating that it would provide developing states the opportunity to 
‘skip the industrialization stage’ and have the ability to transform their economies, 
allowing them to make vast contributions to the global economy. 
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According to Seth (2019), 4IR continues to change diplomatic discourse as science and 
technology transform every corner of society. Nguru (2020), shares similar sentiments, 
stating that the latest industrial revolution has brought the world to a technological turning 
point. The author further emphasises that at this turning point, it is imperative for Africa 
to forge new relations and embrace new opportunities as digital diplomacy becomes 
more of a reality in Africa.  
Scott, Heumann and Lorenz (2018:5), discuss the incorporation of AI in foreign policy, 
stating that the inclusion of technology into diplomatic practice has been a complex 
process yielding mixed results. However, the authors suggest that incorporating digital 
technologies into diplomacy has led to differing results in comparison to the inclusion of 
digital technologies into society at large, therefore there is a need for a smoother ‘process 
of adaptation’. Scott et al., (2018:7) highlight that the newly found transformations of AI 
will indefinitely intersect with traditional foreign policy.  
McCarthy (2015), states that the internet is an integral aspect of America’s foreign policy 
as it is a form of ‘institutional power’ and aids in promoting the foreign policy of the open-
door position that the United States of America (USA) has taken.  
A recent conference held by the Diplo Foundation (2019,) emphasised that AI will aid 
diplomacy in two ways: a) supporting the work of diplomats; and b) highlights the impact 
of AI on human rights. While the Diplo Foundation acknowledges the power of AI in 
diplomacy, it fails to go into greater detail about how AI may support the work of diplomats 
and does not further unpack the types of implications that AI will have on human rights. 
Lastly, the foundation fails to offer suggestions for this potential challenge.  
According to Manor (2018:3), the use of digital technologies in diplomacy has become 
increasingly popular, citing a number of examples such as the Palestine government 
making use of Facebook for engagement with Israeli citizens; state ambassadors utilising 
Skype to have online discussions with students; and even the Indian government 
creating mobile application games for children in the diaspora. Furthermore, Manor 
(2018:5) suggests that not only do digital technologies introduce new or updated 
functionalities, but also encourage the promotion of new norms and expedite new 
behaviour. 
Cucos (2012:1), critically examines virtual diplomacy, stating that a large number of 
‘embassies, consulates, and other types of foreign representation’ have been closing 
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down due to staggering effects of economic recessions affecting countries across the 
globe that diplomats are not immune to, irrespective of diplomatic immunities. This has 
led to an increase in the use of virtual diplomacy which may be understood as 
governments making use of IT to achieve their foreign policy goals or objectives. Cull 
(2013:124) also explores the emergence of public diplomacy, stating that its rise is due 
to the influence of public opinion stemming from the increasing use of technology which 
Cull describes as the ‘communications revolution’. The new rising public diplomacy made 
room for a larger and more open dialogue and exchange of information. 
With the costs tied to the use of the latest technologies, it poses a major concern as to 
whether this may act as a possible barrier for some states and creating an exclusive 
environment in international relations. According to Poro (2017), the response of 
countries will be imperative as it may either lead to opportunity or crisis, sharing the 
sentiments of the WEF which stated that the 4IR may lead to distinguishing between 
states who are ‘innovative-rich’ and ‘innovative-poor’ in a time where natural resources 
will come to mean very little. However, Brynjolfsson et al., (2014), suggest that the states 
that will reap the most from the 4IR will be those who can produce innovative ideas; 
rather than previously when cheap labour, mass production and financial resources were 
imperative to a country’s economic success and position in a global political economy.  
Chitaba (2018), also states that the innovators will reap the most in the era of 4IR and 
there is a dire need for those with intellectual capacity and those with financial capital to 
come together.  
According to Veihmeyer (2016), individual strategies designed by states to integrate 4IR 
will increase the possibility of friction in global competitiveness and instead, states should 
work in a collaborative effort to stimulate economic growth for all. Despite what the author 
offers as an ideal way forward, the research does not explore case studies between 
developed and developing actors or non-state actors to establish if the proposed solution 
is viable.  
Galvan (2016), has stated that the rapid change brought by 4IR to the way we live, work 
and communicate will require fresh policies by governments to ensure that it is not only 
existing players who benefit but that the new technological advancements serve the 
citizens. According to Schwab (2016a), 4IR has the ability to empower individuals and 
communities at large due to ‘new opportunities for economic, social and personal 
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development’ but warns that 4IR could also lead to the increased marginalisation of some 
groups and may intensify inequality. Such inequalities may not only exist at an individual 
level but also in states, which the study aims to explore.  
Following the exploration of the above literature, it may be stated that there is literature 
available that discusses technological influences on diplomacy, but these discussions do 
not focus on the specific influence of 4IR and the technologies that drive the latest 
industrial revolution. As highlighted from the above authors, the internet and 
communication technologies and infrastructure have had a significant influence on 
diplomacy becoming somewhat digitised. Some authors have reflected on the potential 
of AI in diplomacy and foreign policy but do not go into great detail or rather choose to 
focus on one area of diplomacy, like communication or decision-making. Therefore, it 
may be stated that this particular study fills a large gap in knowledge as it explores a 
wide spectrum of diplomacy, reviewing the implications of 4IR on communication, 
interdependence, domestic and international legal frameworks, new ‘new’ diplomacy and 
diplomatic functions. In addition, instead of focusing on one technology of 4IR, it explores 
different types of technologies within 4IR to establish the wholesome implications of 4IR 
on diplomacy. 
1.9 Research methodology  
This research study is qualitative and exploratory in nature. Qualitative research provides 
the ‘why’ and the goal of it is to have a deeper and more comprehensive understanding 
of a specific subject matter (Domheldt, 1993). According to Haradhan (2018), qualitative 
research allows researchers to understand and interpret issues and from there, generate 
new concepts and theories. Furthermore, the strengths of qualitative research are that it 
is rich and detailed offering deeper insights and with the advantages of being flexible and 
the researcher has a clear vision of the outcomes. However, the weaknesses are its time-
consuming and costly nature.  
Research may be exploratory, explanatory or descriptive. According to Babbie and 
Mouton (2003), exploratory research explores a particular research topic or subject 
matter to provide a basic understanding and familiarity with the topic as it is most likely 
relatively new. Explanatory research attempts to explain something and descriptive 
research describes events or phenomena. For the purpose of this study, exploratory 
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research is appropriate due to the relative newness of 4IR, especially in relation to 
diplomacy.  
The study is made up of a desktop research approach. It explores primary and secondary 
resources such as books, journal articles, conference papers and newspaper articles to 
reach a conclusion which should assist in answering the three research questions. 
Although this approach has often been critiqued for being time-consuming, it provides 
advantages as one ought to review various sources which may bring a researcher to 
real-life and plausible conclusions through the identification of common factors, verifying 
the hypothesis or assisting the researcher in reaching the answers to the research 
questions (Yin,1984:13). In addition, Yin (2011), describes ‘surfing the web’ as a useful 
tactic in research as it may lead to the findings of new or related sources, albeit a time-
consuming process. However, this is suitable for the topic as the internet possesses most 
of the relevant information pertaining to the research as it is a new topic that is discussed 
daily. The internet therefore retrieves new information daily.  
The study takes on a multiple case study approach where a number of countries are 
explored. The advantages of this approach is that with a wider lens, exploring multiple 
case studies, it may be established how widespread the implications of 4IR are around 
the world. In addition, it highlights how far the implications extend despite a country’s 
development, economic status or resources. The downside to this approach rests in the 
fact that the analysis may lack depth as it explores factors at surface level but does not 
provide a more detailed analysis. However, Greene and David (1984), outline that a 
multiple case study approach may allow a researcher to reach plausible conclusions, 
rather than looking at a single case study where inaccurate generalizations may be 
made.  
1.10 Chapter layout  
Chapter 1: Introduction to the study outlines the study and the reason for the study. 
This chapter includes the background of the research, one main research question, two 
sub-questions and objectives. In addition, the problem statement and limitations of the 
study are explored. A literature review that explores brief background of content on the 
same or similar matters which has previously been researched is provided. This is 
followed by the research methodology which explains the methods set out to conduct the 
research and lastly the structure of the dissertation is provided.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual framework deeply unpacks the concepts at the heart of the 
study including that of diplomacy at large and the 4IR, providing readers with a clear 
understanding of the subject matter. The chapter traces back the historical evolution of 
diplomacy, providing critical understanding of how diplomacy has continuously been 
influenced over time. Furthermore, industrial revolutions are discussed, providing detail 
as to why 4IR differs from any other previous industrial revolution. The chapter then 
critically explores the subset technologies of 4IR which may have an effect on diplomacy. 
Chapter 3: The pillars of diplomacy affected by 4IR explores the theoretical 
implications that 4IR may have on the concept of diplomacy. The chapter explores five 
pillars of diplomacy which are: communication, interdependence, domestic and 
international legal frameworks, new ‘new’ diplomacy and diplomatic functions.  
Chapter 4: 4IR impact in application explores the practical implications of 4IR on 
diplomacy, reviewing various examples of diplomatic practice influenced by 4IR in 
relation to the aforementioned pillars of diplomacy. In addition, chapter four deals with 
the potential of a new global order that attempts to answer the third research question, 
‘do costs act as a barrier to states?’  
Chapter 5: Findings and conclusion: a concluding chapter which may tie any possible 
loose ends together and ensure that the research questions have been thoroughly dealt 
with. If it is found that 4IR has theoretical and/or practical implications for diplomacy, key 
recommendations may be made on the essence and practice of diplomacy which may 










Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The key concepts utilised as a lens for this study are: a) diplomacy, and b) industrial 
revolutions, but more specifically the concept of the 4IR. These concepts are imperative 
for the understanding of the study and will therefore be discussed. First, a historical 
account for each concept will be provided. For diplomacy, this will then allow one to 
understand the evolution of diplomacy and where it currently stands. For the 4IR, the first 
three industrial revolutions will be explored for a clear understanding of how the current 
industrial revolution differs from prior ones and how it may possibly impact the field of 
diplomacy.  
2.2 Diplomacy  
As aforementioned, diplomacy may be easily understood as interaction between states 
(Eilers, 2006). According to Bjola and Kornprobst (2018), communication forms an 
integral aspect of diplomacy and when it is institutionalised it forms the very basic 
foundation of diplomacy where state representatives are able to push their state’s 
national interests in international relations.  Spies (2016:39), defines diplomacy as an 
instrument or tool of foreign policy with the purpose of representing, communicating and 
intermediating. Additional elements of diplomacy include negotiation and reconciliation. 
According to Berridge (2015:1), diplomacy is an imperative political activity where states 
are able to direct and secure their foreign policy objectives without resorting to coercion 
or propaganda. Berridge (2015:5) further explains that most states have a special 
ministry dedicated specifically to foreign affairs, this is often known as the MFA. However, 
the work of the staff that forms a part of MFA and diplomats working abroad, on special 
missions, is mostly very different. In addition, it is worth noting that the MFA has to work 
in conjunction with other departments or ministries and government actors to make 
foreign policy decisions and carry out such decisions (Berridge, 2015:19).  
Kelley (2010: 286-287) describes diplomacy as the ability of states to positively engage 
in diplomatic relations with one another. Sharing a clear understanding of the rules of the 
game, both states ought to willingly recognise the sovereignty of the other state, then 
have the ability to achieve political ends.  
Adler-Nissen (2015:27) states that the scope of diplomacy extends far beyond 
maintaining the international system and overseeing international relations but also 
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includes governance which covers the legislation that guides the interaction between 
diplomats, heads of states and other relative entities. The work of a diplomat is not to 
merely act as a messenger on behalf of their state but diplomats are also responsible for 
positioning their state in alignment with its policies and objectives in the international 
society. The role of diplomats also extend to conflict prevention and mediation and 
establishing stronger economic, political and cultural relations with states.  
2.2.1 Historical evolution of diplomacy 
Throughout history, we have witnessed two phases of diplomacy, old and new. Old 
diplomacy began in the ancient Greek era until 1914 and new diplomacy emerged in 
1919 and continues until the present.  
2.2.1.1 Old diplomacy 
Black (2011:43), a key author on literature of old diplomacy, stated that the central 
features of diplomacy at the time were: state systems; centralised governments; and 
sovereign states, all of which emphasise the role of the state. Niccolo Machiavelli who 
was a key player in spearheading old diplomacy in the 15th and 16th centuries, stated 
that the raison détat for diplomacy was for states to pursue their national interests and 
increase their power in the international society (Zondi, 2016:25-26). Henry Kissinger 
also emphasised the centrality of a state’s national interest in old diplomacy (Black, 2010: 
149).    Old diplomacy began in roughly 700 BC and concluded in 1914 (Eilers, 2006).  
According to Geraud (1945), alliances were a key feature of old diplomacy and such 
alliances were mostly bilateral in nature. Eilers (2006), describes the relations between 
city-states or states as merely ‘low levels of interaction’ which did not specifically focus 
on trade, economic or political relations. Otte (2007), refers to old diplomacy as ‘secret 
diplomacy’ as it was primarily conducted in a private setting, behind closed doors and 
deemed as highly classified.  
Leguey-Feilleux (2009:25), provides an in-depth analysis of diplomacy and diplomatic 
practices in the ancient world since 3000 B.C.E in Sumer (Mesopotamia), today known as 
Iraq and Kuwait. Sumer consisted of the first known and actively bilaterally engaging 
communities which consisted of complex and integrated political, social and economic 
structures. Diplomacy was regarded as an instrument of the gods or goddesses. The 
city-states of Sumer collectively selected one powerful city-state to oversee and maintain 
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interstate relations1. In addition, chosen city-states had the obligation of mediating 
conflict which often occurred. Legueuy-Feilleux highlights that the ‘supervisory function’ 
was then considered the bulk of diplomatic practices but further processes of diplomacy 
remain unknown due to minimal recorded documentation. 
Legueuy-Feilleux (2009: 26-33), accounts for a number of other examples of ancient 
diplomacy including: Akkad, China, Assyria and the Hittite empire. All states maintained 
diplomatic relations with their neighbours, most city-states relied on diplomatic missions 
to maintain such relations and employed diplomatic envoys. Key commonalities which 
are noted in historical diplomatic practices are diplomatic representation, communication 
through the use of envoys and conflict management (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018:14).  
The most significant historical contribution to diplomacy occurred in ancient Greece with 
interstate relations, merely for peaceful coexistence (Roberts, 2009:6). The author further 
states that diplomatic immunity was not an integral aspect of interstate relations. 
Diplomatic immunity would only later become such an imperative factor in diplomatic 
relations that it has an exclusive clause in the VCDR of 1961, which will be explored later 
in the chapter in line with the evolution. Furthermore, in the era of ancient Greece 
(700BC), there was the formation of alliances leading to the Peloponnesian League and 
later, the Delian League. Lastly, political-military alliances were formed which was 
essential in the maintenance of a peaceful existence between city-states (Mammadova, 
2017:4). 
According to Bjola and Kornprobst (2018:17), ancient Greece consisted of a highly 
sophisticated diplomatic system, comprising of frequent diplomatic missions, respect for 
diplomatic immunities and privileges, in addition to  respect for treaties and alliances that 
were formed; and lastly, the system had maintained a quality calibre of public debate. 
The reflection of the Grecian diplomatic system, which may act as a mirrored reflection 
of diplomacy today, highlights the significant role that Greece played in contributing to 
diplomacy. It indefinitely cemented the foundation of traditional diplomacy. Furthermore, 
the diplomatic system comprised of the institutions that exclusively dealt with diplomacy, 
such as the angelos, proxenos and keryx which were different types of diplomatic 
representation. Political-military alliances were also a crucial element in ensuring a 
 
1 According to Longley (2019), a city-state may be deemed as a small and independent country that ‘consists of a 
single city’.  The size of the city-state is relatively small and it consists of a self-governing body.  
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peaceful existence which greatly contributed to Sparta and Athens merging into one 
(Mammadova, 2017:4).  
According to Nicolson (1969:25), the diplomatic traditions established by the Greeks 
were later passed on to the Romans but suggest that the Romans did not make a 
significant contribution to diplomacy but rather to international law. The Roman empire 
had minimal efforts in attempting to establish a body of trained experts dealing with 
negotiations. Legueuy-Feilleux (2009:33), shares Nicolson’s sentiments and highlights 
that Rome’s contribution to diplomacy was ‘less than expected’. The empire utilised the 
methods of temporary missions but did not deploy a skilful negotiator but rather a 
prominent citizen who was regarded as prestigious by the Roman Senate. Rome 
engaged heavily in alliances and international treaties, often with its neighbours. 
However, it is notable that Rome did not use diplomacy as a mode of maintaining 
supremacy but rather for global business transactions and legal relations which 
cemented a new space for international relations. 
Zondi (2016: 26), emphasises the significance of 1648 for diplomacy when the Peace 
Treaty of Westphalia was signed. The reason for its significance, diplomatically speaking, 
was because of the negotiations that occurred between states to achieve an international 
society which consists of a balance of power, territorial integrity and sovereign states. 
According to Geraud (1945), the introduction of a balance of power into the international 
system was an attempt to ensure that no single state, or group of states, may possess 
large amounts of power and undue influence that it becomes a law in itself.  
The era of old diplomacy concluded roughly four years after the Congress of Vienna took 
place in 1815 with the hope of reducing the possible risks of imperialism, prompting the 
structure of a new world order through restructured alliances (Roberts, 2009:12). The 
Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia was a substantial 
document of the Congress and proved to be symbolic to diplomacy.  
2.2.1.2 New diplomacy  
Geraud (1945), describes new diplomacy as the ‘universal association of compliance’, 
symbolising multilateralism and openness. Black (2010), refers to the introduction of non-
state actors into diplomatic relations as a central feature of new diplomacy. Initially, non-
state actors spoke mostly of international organisations such as the UN but over time it 
has evolved into MNCs and interest groups.  
21 
 
Bjola and Kornprobst (2018:37), state that the introduction of new diplomacy was 
prompted by three major factors. First, there was a strong desire for colonial expansion 
by the great powers which would greatly impact foreign policy and more significantly, 
would impact and potentially strain diplomatic relations among these powers causing a 
tense international society. Second, traditional methods of diplomatic negotiation and 
mere interaction had changed due to the fast-paced rise of communication, improving 
not only by method but also by speed. Third, the USA began to have a rising influence 
in the international society and the regulations of diplomacy had to be slightly altered 
accordingly due to the distrustful relationship between the Americans and the Europeans. 
President Woodrow Wilson of the USA then became a key contributor in the 
conceptualisation of new diplomacy and its transition from old diplomacy at the end of 
World War I.  
New diplomacy began roughly from 1919 onwards, where a notable shift took place from 
bilateral relations to multilateral relations between states and also the formation of 
international organisations (Geraud, 1945:246). Alliances were formed and mutual 
agreements were signed to ensure a more peaceful international society which was a 
key priority in comparison to old diplomacy where states tried their best to gain and 
preserve power. 
Morgenthau (1945), recollects the sentiments of Woodrow Wilson, former US President. 
Wilson called for the end of an era that was ruled by power politics and welcomed the 
theme of international collaboration. According to Asada (2006), Washington strongly 
believed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance, that began in 1902, was a reflection of 
Wilson’s unwanted old diplomacy that consisted of a military alliance which possessed 
significant influence. This represents the growing call, led by Wilson and Washington, to 
embrace new diplomacy that symbolised international cooperation and openness among 
states.  
 In 1920 the League of Nations was formed, initiated by Wilson (Morgenthau, 1946). 
Wilson attempted to create an open international society, where no secrets were held as 
in old diplomacy. The League of Nations made the utmost effort to omit the issue of wars 
occurring without their knowledge and therefore ended the very secrecy that diplomacy 
was built on. Secret treaties were no longer allowed nor was ‘secret foreign policy’ 
permitted. Issues arose due to the exclusion of states from the League of Nations who 
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were then able to have secret relations and treaties among themselves (Nicolson, 
1963:86). Wilson’s efforts of creating a flourishing League of Nations were unsuccessful 
but paved a way for what would come to be the most significant multilateral organisation 
to date, the UN (Legueuy-Feiileux, 2009:45).  
The UN was formally established in 1945, however, it initially lacked comprehensive 
representation due to states believing that they were too powerful to submit to an 
international organisation. Eventually, representation of states improved and the UN 
became a platform for multilateral diplomatic relations. Often states would not engage in 
bilateral relations with one another due to power and status but through the UN, 
multilateralism occurred (Black, 2010:210). After the establishment of the UN, states 
came together to draw up the VCDR of 1961, which aimed to discuss the regularities 
regarding diplomatic relations and diplomatic immunities (Bruns, 2009:22).   
The UN held the much anticipated conference in Vienna in 1961 to discuss diplomatic 
immunity and privilege. The conference was held in Vienna to be seen as a continuation 
of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 where the discussion of diplomatic law first arose. The 
VCDR attempts to uphold peace and security in the international society (VCDR of 1961). 
It can be summarised into four parts. The first part, articles two to 19 are explanatory and 
provide introductory remarks; part two can be considered from articles 20 to 40 and 
discusses diplomatic immunities and privileges as drafted by the International Law 
Commission and is considered the heart of the document. Part three, articles 41 to  47 
covers miscellaneous provisions; and articles 48 to  53 conclude by dealing with the final 
clauses of the VCDR of 1961.  
The VCDR of 1961 has been described as a legal framework that guides interstate 
diplomatic relations. Although many questions have arisen in the last decade regarding 
the relevance of the document taking into consideration the rise of non-state actors, it 
has continued to remain a frame of reference for diplomacy and diplomatic immunities 
and privileges (Wouters and Duquet, 2012:?).  
Bruns (2009), highlights the importance of awarding diplomatic immunity and privileges 
to staff on a diplomatic mission, in addition to that of the diplomatic representative. Brown 
(1988), stipulates that according to the outcome of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
meeting on 24 May 1980, the diplomatic immunities and privileges awarded to diplomatic 
and consular personnel forms an integral aspect of international law.  
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New diplomacy also highlighted a particular shift from the traditional actors of diplomacy 
that were, historically, exclusively states, to include non-state actors (Langhorne, 2005). 
This is noticeable more than ever in the present day with the influence of social media 
and current US President Donald Trump’s ‘Twitter diplomacy’ (Rogers and Landler, 
2019).  
Dinata (2014:1), realised the effects that Twitter had on diplomacy a few years prior to 
the official emergence of 4IR, coining this new era of public diplomacy as 
‘Twiplomacy’.Through the use of Twitter, an international actor may affect the 
perceptions of other international actors with the use of information displayed on social 
media, or in this instance the Twitter platform.  Dinata (2014:3), continues by suggesting 
that public diplomacy has continuously evolved into the trends of social media.  
Table 1: The central features of old and new diplomacy 
Characteristics  Old diplomacy New diplomacy  
Date  700BC- 1914 1919-Present  
Nature  Closed  Open  
Communication Physical missions Physical missions, 
telephonic calls, email.  
Interdependence Low levels of interaction, 
alliances. Bilateralism. 
State is the primary actor  
Multilateralism − states, 




Legislation Congress of Vienna Vienna Convention of 
Diplomatic Relations of 
1963 




Functions  To represent the state and 
achieve the foreign policy 
goals of the state. 
To represent the state and 
achieve the foreign policy 
goals of the state. 
See footnote2 
2.2.1 Recent strands of diplomacy  
Over the last two decades, there has been a noticeable shift in diplomacy due to the 
influence of science and technologies (Cunningham and Dufour, 2003).  Such shifts have 
introduced new strands of diplomacy such as economic diplomacy; science diplomacy; 
and innovation diplomacy. The strand of public diplomacy has also experienced a recent 
rise in diplomatic relations, through sub-topics of digital diplomacy and Twitter diplomacy. 
2.2.2.1 Economic diplomacy  
There is no final agreed upon definition for economic diplomacy. Leonidivina and 
Oleksilvna (2015:136), state that some define economic diplomacy as the interaction of 
economic and trade instruments which have a significant impact on the foreign policy of 
the state. However, for the purpose of this study the definition used by Wayne (2019:23) 
will be utilised, which states that it is the use of diplomatic skills in addition to economic 
tools to advance the political, economic or strategic goals of a state.  
Berridge (2005), explains that political and economic interests reinforce one another. 
Wayne (2019:23) states that economic diplomacy encompasses a range of aspects: first, 
it consists of states building global coalitions to assist countries in recovering from 
financial crises; second, states are most likely to apply measures and policies which will 
be advantageous to their economy, providing jobs for citizens even if it poses political 
costs; third, states may employ economic sanctions on countries to either deter or punish 
actors from making or acting on particular decisions; and lastly, economic diplomacy may 
build support to create and enforce norms and rules in the international society to 
motivate the idea that bribery and corruption is not acceptable. Pigman (2010:139) avers 
that areas of international trade, economic development, financial markets, and monetary 
cooperation and foreign investment are all areas of economic diplomacy. However, 
environmental concerns, such as climate change; pollution; energy; and water, also fall 
 
2 Adapted from Geraud (1945); Black (2010); Eilers (2006); Otte (2007); Roberts (2009); Morgenthau (1946); and 
Langhorne (2005).  
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under the category of economic diplomacy due to the economic and security areas it may 
impact.  
According to Neves (2017:92), economic diplomacy does not imply a dominance of 
economics in international relations but rather a more appropriate and coordinated 
balance of economics and politics. Furthermore, it is not exclusively commercial in nature 
and implements economic tools to achieve negative and positive political goals. Rana 
(2007) emphasises that economic diplomacy is policy-orientated where countries 
prioritise international relations to maximise their state’s national gains, consisting of 
bilateral, multilateral and regional dimensions. According to Berridge (2015:213), 
economic diplomacy may occur at a multilateral level, often constituting  a high-profile 
gathering of heads of states, state ambassadors and diplomats, for instance: G20 
summits, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). However, economic diplomacy may also occur at a much lower bilateral level, 
which does not mean it is any less significant.  
2.2.2.2 Science diplomacy  
Hennessy (2019:26) analyses what science diplomacy is, establishing that it is a form of 
diplomacy which aims to create and nourish scientific collaborations improving 
relationships among states. In addition, by providing scientific advice, foreign policy 
objectives can be more informed, creating greater opportunities for international 
cooperation and investment. The collaboration between scientists and diplomats has 
become increasingly important due to supranational challenges such as climate change, 
rapid urbanisation and diseases.  
According to Vitorovic and Santacroce (2019), science diplomacy aids in promoting 
domestic and global interests with the ultimate goal of enabling peace and progress of 
the international society through creating new ideas, methods, and approaches to 
addressing ‘asymmetric and imbalanced tendencies’ of the global world. As previously 
stated, many issues are supranational which means that problems are often cross-border 
in nature and cannot be solved by one country alone, therefore, collaboration is required.  
Hoy (2019:875), explores the historical background of science diplomacy, highlighting 
that scientists formed collaborative relationships, despite the existing tensions between 
their respective governments. The American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS) has been a key organisation in promoting science diplomacy. Former 
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Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of AAAS told Hoy that collaboration is imperative to ensure 
the advancement of science and in turn will be beneficial to all of global society. AAAS 
also emphasises the dire need to address global challenges, as mentioned above.  
While historically when considering the disciplines of diplomacy and science respectively, 
one is naturally inclined to discuss the two separately. However, Vitorović and 
Santacroce (2019), suggest that the two disciplines are undeniably interconnected and 
may either advance or hinder the response by states, international organisations and 
other actors to global atrocities.  
2.2.2.3 Public diplomacy  
Ahyan (2018:1) states that public diplomacy was coined by Edmund Gullion in 1965, 
defining it as the influence of public attitudes and opinions in relation to foreign policy. 
Public diplomacy also extends beyond the traditional scope of diplomacy and delves into 
private group interaction, foreign affairs news reports and how it impacts foreign policy, 
communication between foreign actors and diplomats and intercultural communications. 
Berridge (2015:200) refers to public diplomacy as propaganda, stating that it is the 
attempt to exercise indirect influence on a foreign state, by bypassing the government in 
an attempt to persuade a population of a certain agenda  Historically, tools used to 
influence public opinion include newspapers, radio broadcasting stations, television and 
more recently, social media. Cull (2013:124) states that the evolution and growth of 
technology and public diplomacy occurred simultaneously, intertwining with one another.  
Brown (2004:16) had very early on predicted that public diplomacy would become more 
relevant as non-state actors become increasingly important and international 
communication infrastructures have emerged.  Public diplomacy may be understood as 
international relations that extend beyond the realm of traditional diplomacy where there 
is a significant influence from public opinion, private interest groups, international media 
that influences policymaking, and intercultural communication processes.  
Nye (2008:95) discusses public diplomacy as a form of soft power, stating that there are 
three major aspects to it. First, it consists of daily communication which refers to media 
management; second, strategic communication which promotes a specific foreign policy 
agenda and is advantageous as it enhances public visibility and gains support; and third, 
relationship building which emphasises ‘people-to-people’ relations (2008:97).  
27 
 
2.2.2.4 Digital diplomacy  
Manor (2017) credits 2017 as the birth of digital diplomacy, contrary to Verrekia’s (2017) 
sentiments that argue that Hillary Clinton’s 2009-2013 stint as Secretary of State saw the 
emergence of digital diplomacy.  
According to Adesina (2017:4), digital diplomacy evolves from public diplomacy. Bronk 
(2010:43) describes the digitisation of diplomacy as the ‘most significant change’ to 
diplomacy since the introduction of the telegram. Very early on, governments started to 
realise the notable influence that IT will have on diplomacy with Hillary Clinton advocating 
for ‘smart power’, in 2009, over hard and soft power (Lewis and Walker, 2009). Joseph 
Nye, key theorist of soft power, termed the combined use of hard and soft power as 
‘smart power’ in 2003 after noting the changing environment of foreign policy where hard 
and soft power can be used together to achieve maximum results (Nye, 2009).  
There is no single agreed-upon definition of digital diplomacy. Manor and Segev (2015) 
describe it as the increasingly popular use of social media platforms by a state to achieve 
its foreign policy objectives and control its international image. On the other hand, Lewis 
(2014) suggests that it is the use of ‘digital tools of communication’, such as the use of 
social media, where diplomats can openly engage with one another and the general 
public. Lastly, Hanson (2012) terms it as the utilisation of ICTs and the internet to pursue 
diplomatic aims and objectives. For the purpose of this dissertation, the definition put 
forward by Lewis (2012) will be utilised, noting that the ultimate aim of digital diplomacy 
is to achieve foreign policy goals.  
Grant (2004), discusses the significant impact that the internet has on foreign policy, 
stating that technology influences the flow and availability of information  across the 
world. This suggests that it gives other individuals greater opportunities to be involved in 
decision-making. In addition, Adesina (2017:7), explains that states are seizing the 
opportunity to enhance the way that they project themselves in the international arena 
through the use of blogs, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms.  
The space of digital diplomacy is populated by the use of Twitter, increasingly highlighted 
in recent years. Sobel, Riffe, and Hester (2016:77), regard the use of Twitter by a 
government as a ‘public relations tool’, commonly termed as ‘twiplomacy’. Dumčiuvienė 
(2016:92), also categorises Twitter diplomacy as a tool of public diplomacy where 
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governments, state officials and organisations may publicly engage with one another and 
other global audiences.  
Jones and Matticci (2017:741), suggest that social media, heavily emphasising the use 
of Twitter, is often utilised by rebel organisations, dubbing this as ‘rebel diplomacy’. 
These organisations are able to execute and control their own narrative, promoting the 
agenda of their organisation, and aim to positively persuade international audiences in 
believing they are credible. By doing so, not only do rebel organisations gain international 
attention but they also gain significant support. After much exploration regarding the 
correlation between the use of Twitter and rebel organisations, Jones and Mattiacci 
(2017:741) have established that the use of Twitter by rebels enhances cooperation by 
a) clarifying the goals, in reference to regime type, and b) emphasising the possible ‘so-
called’ atrocities committed by government.  
 2.3 Industrial revolutions  
Over the past two to three centuries, the world has  witnessed four periods of 
industrialisation and change (Sentryo, 2019). The first industrial revolution began in 1765 
in Britain, prompted by Sir Richard Arkwright who invented the spinning machine and 
which led to a new realm of manufacturing and soon, mass production. Mass extraction 
also occurred, which introduced the rise of the steam engine. In this period, agrarian 
states became industrialised and went through a process of urbanisation. The second 
industrial revolution occurred in 1870 and is also classified as the ‘technological 
revolution’ where methods of communication changed to that of telegraphs and 
telephones. There was also a new reliance on gas and oil as a source of energy. The 
third revolution, in 1969, saw the introduction of biotechnology and high-level automation, 
and, in addition, there was a rise in the development and use of electronics and nuclear 
energy (Sentryo, 2019).  
The first industrial revolution changed the world forever, from agrarian societies to 
economies centred on machine manufacturing (Flashes Magazine, 2017:56). It 
influenced population growth, foreign trade and the demand for manufactured goods. 
However, the first industrial revolution introduced dire social and economic 
consequences.  Haupert (2019:243) states that the first industrial revolution resulted in 
the amplification of large economic inequalities and poverty, in addition to decreasing 
profits and rising foreign competition.  
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The second industrial revolution consisted of better technological machinery, 
interchangeable parts, mass communication, and factory line production. Its impact was 
much wider-reaching and impactful in comparison to the first industrial revolution, 
reaching the US, Germany, Great Britain, France and Japan (Flashes Magazine, 
2017:56). The three key facets of the second industrial revolution were electricity, 
petroleum, and steel. These facets fast-tracked urbanisation and transportation, in 
addition to the use of telegraphs, trolleys, railroads and the increased construction of 
skyscrapers. Railroads were an imperative factor in the process of industrialisation as it 
connected both people and markets which prompted economic growth and development 
(Mokyr, 1999:2).  
Flashes Magazine (2017:55) describes the third industrial revolution as the ‘digital 
revolution’ which introduced previously unimaginable technologies and innovative 
advancements. A transition occurred from mechanisation to digitisation. Furthermore, 
Flashes provides a history of key events that occurred during the period of 4IR: 
➢ 1969− APRANET (succeeded by the Internet)3 
➢ 1971− First email sent  
➢ 1971− First games console was released  
➢ 1981− First laptop on sale  
Greenwood (1999:2) emphasises the direct correlation between high-speed 
technological processes, decreased human-centred productivity and an increase in wage 
inequalities that occurred from 1974 at the introduction of the third industrial revolution. 
This highlights the impact of IT since the previous industrial revolution, having a great 
effect on sectors; however, was not as impactful as the industrial revolution currently 
being experienced today.  
Below, Figure 1 provides a brief description of the various industrial revolutions, 




3 APRANET is the oldest merger of computational networks. The invention of APRANET was led by the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) after the US called for a mode for the quick transportation of information in the 
case of a catastrophic event (Strickland, nd).  
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Figure 1: Key elements of industrial revolutions 
 
 (I-Scoop, 2019).  
2.4 Fourth Industrial Revolution 
The 4IR is different to all previous revolutions, Schwab (2016b) clarifies that this 
particular revolution is much larger and more radical than ever before, categorising it as 
the ‘digital revolution’. Chitaba (2018) further emphasises that 4IR is the fusion of 
technological methods and processes removing barriers and borders between biological, 
physical and digital spheres; and Chitaba also emphasises that it differs from previous 
industrial revolutions due to its whirlwind emergence and propagation of information. The 
importance of 4IR is that it will lead to significant changes in government systems, 
production, and management (Chitaba, 2018).  
Schwab (2016b) states that for three reasons 4IR may be understood as an entirely new 
revolution rather than merely a continuation from the third industrial revolution, this being: 
‘velocity, scope, and systems impact’. No other revolution has had such an enormous 
impact in such a small space of time; it is affecting every industry imaginable, further 
impacting governance, production, and management.  
The Mail and Guardian (6 September 2019) interviewed Nicholas Davis who worked 
alongside Klaus Schwab and was instrumental in coining the term the ‘fourth industrial 
revolution’. Davis categorises 4IR as another stage of human development which was 
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their reason behind the name of the latest industrial wave, stating that actors would need 
to know and understand early on what the revolution meant to avoid making mistakes as 
in prior revolutions, such as overinvesting in particular technologies or incorrect 
implementation processes.  Davis continues by distinguishing between the previous 
digital revolution by stating that algorithms play a central role in decision-making for 
humans. This is potentially threatening as humans begin to become less and less 
autonomous and leave computer systems to make bold decisions on behalf of 
governments, such as in times of combat or in decision-making processes.  
Schwab (2015:4) states that 4IR may gear up income levels and improve the standard 
and quality of living for individuals around the globe, as developing states may skip 
stages of industrialisation that were previously missed.  However, one cannot ignore that 
those who have benefited from a digitised world are mostly those that can afford it with 
new and improved products and services continuously established to enhance daily 
efficiency. Such technological advancements have contributed towards easier and 
simple living, such as booking flights, buying products from the comfort of your own 
home, ordering a cab with the mere click of a button on your smartphone and making 
banking transactions.  
Schwab (2015:5), highlights the bright side for those of lower-income levels, stating that 
in due time technologies will drastically improve both productivity and efficiency which 
will have a domino effect for transportation and communication. Both equally vital sectors 
will see a decrease in costs along with more effective supply chains and logistics. As a 
result, global trading costs will shrink or altogether diminish, opening up opportunities for 
new markets to emerge. In addition to such factors being a positive accelerator for 
economic growth, it poses as an opportunity for more individuals and developing 
countries to partake in emerging markets and become significant actors in such markets 
instead of historically where global capital belonged to a select elite.  
4IR will impact governments, businesses, and individuals. Schwab (2015:7) begins by 
discussing the impact on businesses, simplifying this impact into four ultimate effects: 
the changing expectations of consumers due to a wider variety of products and services 
to choose from; the ability to enhance products through digital processes and the use of 
new technologies; the opportunity to collaborate with other businesses due to 
technological disruptions and a wider consumer base; and lastly, considering 
32 
 
cyberspace, businesses, and consumers are able to interact on a global scale reaching 
different cultures and talent and therefore organisational reform is imperative.  
For governments, access to new technologies allows for greater control and surveillance 
of populations (Schwab, 2015:8). However, governments may experience more pressure 
if they stick to traditional methods of public engagement. For example, the use of social 
media allows government to interact more closely with its citizens and also to a greater 
number of its population in comparison to previously. Although, for government to be 
successful in the era of 4IR, it will need to adopt agility, having the ability to quickly adapt 
to changing situations and to react to changes at a faster pace than ever before. The 
new technologies introduced by the latest industrial revolution will also have a profound 
impact on national and international security and ultimately changing the face of warfare 
with autonomous weapons that are becoming more and more easily accessible to 
various actors.  
Schwab (2015:9) insists that 4IR does not only change the things individuals do but it 
also changes who they are. Privacy is repeatedly emphasised in the study of 4IR and 
often a crucial part of who we are as human beings, yet humans constantly feel the need 
to be ‘connected’ and share their daily activities. In addition, 4IR has the potential to 
impact when we work and how we work; the skills we attain and potentially how we 
develop such skills;  it is already illustrated daily that technology plays a role in meeting 
people and how we nourish our relationships online, often without physical interaction.  
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2012:28) discuss the implications of an automated society, 
highlighting that although the ‘economic pie’ may be getting bigger, it does not 
necessarily suggest that all will benefit from it. The replacement of labourers by 
machinery may result in larger inequality in societies as capital returns increase while 
labour returns decrease. Schwab (2015:5) notes this possible effect but claims it may 
yield  greater possibilities as labourers are forced to enhance their skills resulting in highly 
skilled and rewarding jobs with higher income levels, where those with lower skills will 
continue to earn lower wages which too will have an impact on social relations.  
Sentryo (2019), a leading institution exploring possible vulnerabilities introduced by the 
IoT, states that 4IR introduces a virtual world. Now more than ever, there is an increased 
reliance on AI, IoT, and robotics. Berger (2019) states that AI aids us in finding solutions 
in a ‘human-like manner’, with the ability to perform tasks which often a human would do; 
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with the ability to reason, generalise, uncover meaning and learn from past mistakes. 
Berger further explains machine-learning, also an integral aspect of 4IR, which analyses 
data to reach almost perfect conclusions.  
2.4.1 Aspects of 4IR  
4IR consists of a number of integral aspects that make up its enormous revolution and 
impact. Aspects specifically significant to this dissertation and the study of diplomacy are 
big data, AI, IoT, cybersecurity and cyberspace, ICT and robotics, as depicted in Figure 
2 below (I-Scoop,2019). The study will provide a detailed explanation of the aspects 
mentioned above for further understanding later as to how such aspects may impact 
diplomacy.  





2.4.1.1 Big data  
According to Hurwitz, Kaufman, Halper, and Nugent (2013:10), big data is considered a 
data source when it consists of at least three commonalities: ‘large volumes of data, high 
velocity of data, and a wide variety of data’. It enables organisations to gather, store, 
interpret, manipulate and manage large amounts of data in a timely manner, to gather 
appropriate insights. Furthermore, it is worth noting that big data is not new or stand-
alone technology but has developed and evolved over the last 50 years. Hurwitz et al., 
(2013:15-16) titles it old and new technology, highlighting that it allows organisations, 
companies or individuals to efficiently gather data, interpret it and respond.  
Big data is crucial for decision-making. Oracle South Africa (2019) states that with the 
latest technological discoveries, data storage and computing have become significantly 
less expensive, suggesting that companies, organisations and various actors can now 
store more data more cheaply. With greater accessibility to big data analytics, decision-
making can be more efficient and accurate.  
According to Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger (2013:40), big data is more than merely 
communication but allows us to learn from an extremely vast body of information which 
is more than we could previously comprehend. The expansion of big data has been 
immense in just a short period of time: in 2000 only a quarter of the world’s information 
was digitally recorded, but, fast forward to 2013, only 2% of such information remains 
non-digital. In addition, not only has big data grown in size but also in impact and 
possibilities, with the process of ‘datafication’, just about any piece of information is 
digitised such as GPS, books and even friendships through social media.  
Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger (2013:42), explain that there are three central changes 
when dealing with data: first, large amounts of data should be collected rather than 
previously when only small amounts were collected. Second, researchers should accept 
and utilise ‘messy’ data; previously, data was cleaned to be made as pristine as possible 
but may limit your outcomes as opposed to messy data which may gather and interpret 
more information. Third, big data allows researchers to have access to massive amounts 
of information and ‘everything that is associated with them’. This may assist researchers 
in identifying patterns and predicting future events.  
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2.4.1.2 Artificial intelligence  
A brief definition of AI was provided in the previous chapter, however, AI is much more 
complex than a single definition can provide and encompasses a range of features like 
facial and voice recognition; self-driving cars, drones, online shopping and robotic 
assistants (Hulick, 2016). Many authors heavily rely on the ‘intelligence’ part of the term, 
stating that intelligence is concerned with the mental capabilities to reason, solve 
problems and learn from experiences or situations (Shabbir and Anwer, 2015:1). Shabbir 
and Anwer emphasise that today technologies have the ability to imitate human 
behaviour and even thought processes, with the ability to perform tasks and make 
decisions accordingly. AI software comprises programs inserted into robots, computers 
and other systems.  
AI may be understood as the development of computer systems to assist in finding 
solutions for problems in a human-like manner, it has the ability to reason, generalise 
and aid in understanding past mistakes while it further assists humans in reaching almost 
perfect conclusions (Berger, 2019). However, AI poses a number of challenges such as 
the fact that it is inherently built to perform a specialised task and cannot do more than 
that or deviate from its purpose. In addition, AI learns from and utilises data to reach 
conclusions and therefore inaccuracies are possible (SAS Africa, 2019). 
There are two types of AI: 1) strong AI, and 2) weak AI. Strong AI has the ability to both 
think and act like a human being, learning from experiences. Weak AI is unable to think 
for itself and can merely respond to situations as it has been programmed to, such as 
iPhone’s Siri (Kerns, 2017). 
2.4.1.3 Internet of Things  
The IoT, also known as the Infrastructure of Information Society, is relatively new on the 
ICT scene and is best described as a coalition of digital and physical realms, providing 
instantaneously available information (Chou, 2019: 106-107). According to Qureshi and 
Aldeen (2018:1114), IoT refers to an established network system where different things 
or objects are able to communicate. It consists of ‘intelligent sensing and transmission 
capabilities’ working for various applications such as smart parking, logistics, and smart 
water supply. IoT systems have the ability to be remotely controlled and allow for the 
integration of both computing systems and the physical realm (Stăncioiu, 2017:75). 
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Euchner (2018:10) states that the IoT carries multiple meanings in accordance with its 
purpose with different users and systems, however, simplifies it as an integrated system 
whereby direct communication with devices and users is possible without having to 
access a central server. This simple, yet groundbreaking, factor makes innovation 
possible to all those who have access to the IoT. The possibilities of the IoT is reminiscent 
of the establishment of the Internet, where fruitful growth is promising.  
Qureshi and Aldeen (2018:1114) discuss the advantages of IoT, stating that: it saves 
time; it is beneficial to existing communication structures; it provides learning 
opportunities; and it is an easier platform that is more cost-effective than traditional 
methods. Stăncioiu (2017:75) also highlights the benefits that 4IR holds, stating that it 
enhances efficiency; it is cost-effective; it is flexible; and lastly, it allows for the integration 
of production methods. IoT has gained the attention of corporations, governments, and 
even individuals in their homes due to its advanced smart applications which have the 
ability to make connections and providing new and updated services.  
Following Adryan and Konigsedeer’s (2017) in-depth study of the foundations of IoT, a 
few limitations and drivers have been listed as an imperative for IoT producers and 
consumers going forward. The drivers of IoT, as briefly highlighted above, include cost-
reduction in addition to the possibility of profit-maximisation due to improved efficiency 
and lowered production costs; IoT may also provide the opportunity for a greener 
economy but outcomes are not yet clear enough for producers to make the necessary 
transitions (Adryan and Konigsedeer, 2017:123).  
The limitations of IoT have been discussed very minimally by most authors, with most 
overlooking the disadvantages and opting to discuss the exciting possibilities of IoT. 
However, Adryan and Konigsedeer (2017:124) discuss three major limitations of IoT: 
First, it lacks in operability as current systems are not as up to date as the latest 
technologies and therefore incompatible with the technologies currently utilised by 
organisations and there is no direct solution for this. Second, there is a lack of trust 
among consumers as it is not only governments, organisations and businesses who have 
access to IoT but also every other private individual which makes devices and systems 
vulnerable to hacking and sabotage. It is therefore imperative for IoT engineers to ensure 
the utmost security of IoT systems to build trust with consumers. Third, IoT poses the 
concern of a lack of privacy for consumers. Major questions are raised by consumers, 
37 
 
such as: who owns the generated data, who else has access to it and may possibly make 
decisions based on it. It is imperative for consumers to have answers to such questions 
to understand who their personal data is available to.  
2.4.1.4 Cybersecurity and cyberspace  
Cybersecurity is essential in the light and usage of cyberspace. Cyberspace is a non-
physical dimension that manipulates and exploits information through integrated 
infrastructure systems. Furthermore, cyberspace is an unlimited public good that may be 
understood as a shared space to be used by individuals, governments and non-
governmental organisations. Hess and Ostrom (2007), discuss cyberspace as a common 
resource and highlights that those who are excluded from accessing it may result in their 
limited participation.  
According to Black, Scarfone, and Souppaya (2014:1), cybersecurity can aid 
organisations in various ways. Cybersecurity can ensure verification of security 
measures and controls to ensure compliance with the relevant policies and organisations 
may be able to identify their strengths and weaknesses regarding security. In addition, 
organisations may identify security trends both internal and external. Furthermore, 
cybersecurity is beneficial to organisations through improving security-related 
performance, evaluating compliance, and answering ‘high-level business questions’. 
Reveron (2012:3) suggests that cyberwarfare was predicted long before it became a 
reality. Today, it is not only militaries that hold strong capabilities but other actors too. 
Hackers, cyber terrorists, and intelligence services can be a great threat to the 
cybersecurity of individuals, organisations, governments and international security. 
Reveron continues by recalling the 2008 events of the Russian tankers that entered the 
territory of the Georgian defence force, highlighting that although its effect was not 
destructive, it was indeed ‘disruptive’. 
In 2011, President Barack Obama noted the increasing role that cyberspace was 
beginning to play and introduced the International Strategy for Cyberspace. The 
document emphasised four key elements in dealing with cyberspace: securing trust; 
openness to innovation; ensuring the reliability of cybersecurity systems; and taking into 
consideration the possibilities of future cyber warfare (New York Times, 2011).  
Furthermore, in 2011, the US’s Defence Department established a number of strategic 
initiatives acting as a guideline for when operating in cyberspace. Such initiatives include: 
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building strong relationships with international allies to strengthen cybersecurity; form 
coalitions with other government departments, and the private sector, to form strong 
national cybersecurity; employing new and agile defence systems; and treating 
cyberspace as an ‘operational domain to organize, train and equip’ the state’s defence 
department to fully maximise the potential of cyberspace (Alexander, 2011).   
2.4.1.5 Robotics  
Rus (2015), states that robots have already changed, and continue to, change everyday 
life. Robots have the ability to carry out numerous tasks, that is: perform in manufacturing 
assembly lines and object recognition. Meticulous algorithms have been key in improving 
the functionality of robots, improving coordination, control, reasoning, and perceptions. 
With the exponential growth of robotic technology over the last 20 years, it has found a 
place in multiple fields, such as health care, entertainment and even house-keeping 
(Pagliarini and Lund, 2017: 272). Without even acknowledging it, human-robotic 
interaction occurs daily. Some interactions may be minimal while in other areas, its 
impact cannot be ignored.  
Robotic technology, and all other forms of technology, are not immune to malfunctions 
which may result in dire consequences. The use of autonomous weapons, in particular, 
is an area of major concern and, according to Wisskirchen, Biacabe, and Bormann et al., 
(2017:57), should be banned by the UN. Al-Rodhan (2015:177) discusses the 
proceedings of the 2015 International Joint Conference on AI. More than 1 000 
researchers and various field experts, such as Elon Musk of Tesla and Professor 
Stephen Hawking, presented a letter calling for the ban of autonomous weapons.  
While the intelligence and capabilities of robots have grown exponentially in recent years, 
robotic technology continues to lack moral reasoning. This is a significant pitfall as states 
increasingly begin to rely on robotics for military purposes which may have detrimental 
effects (Al-Rodhan, 2015:178). Nourbakhsh (2015:23), also shares such sentiments, 
stating that robots lack a moral compass and do not have the ability to prevent ‘ethical 
transgressions’, therefore there is no consideration for the protection of human life or 
privacy. Perhaps the lack of moral judgement stems from the fact that programmers and 
engineers of robotics are not also specialists in ethics.  
While Rus (2015), argues that with robotics, driverless cars are a safe, realistic and 
efficient option for human beings, Uber’s recent efforts of autonomous vehicles prove 
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differently. Knowles (2019) discusses the ‘fatal flaw’ of Uber’s autonomous vehicles in 
an attempt to have a self-driving car service: failure to consider pedestrians. The death 
of a pedestrian, Elaine Herzberg, has sparked major concern for the possible future of 
self-driving vehicles after the vehicle’s software failed to detect the pedestrian in time and 
bumped into her, ultimately leading to her death. It is crucial for software engineers and 
programmers to incorporate the considerations for human intervention to avoid such 
accidents and have successful and safe autonomous vehicles.  
2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has critically explored the concepts of diplomacy and industrial revolutions, 
but more specifically, 4IR. The evolution of diplomacy has been traced back to where it 
occurred at a very minimal level. By tracing the evolution of diplomacy, it may be stated 
that diplomacy has continuously evolved, specifically in accordance with current societal 
and global trends. It is clear that diplomacy has experienced significant influences from 
technological fields and digital domains as new technologies emerged. Industrial 
revolutions have continuously been influential in a range of areas. However, the latest 
industrial revolution is considered to be the most impactful of all industrial revolutions due 
to the snowballing effects that its technologies possess, affecting virtually every sphere 
of life. As established in the chapter, most aspects of 4IR have a place in various fields 
of society and its impact cannot be ignored. The following chapter will explore the 
theoretical impact that 4IR may have on diplomacy, critically exploring readings and 










Chapter 3: Pillars of Diplomacy Affected by 4IR 
3.1 Introduction 
Following a review of the key issues in diplomacy that are or will be implicated by 4IR, 
this dissertation categorises the issues as follows: communication, interdependence, 
domestic and international legal frameworks, actors and openness, and diplomatic 
functions. This chapter will explore the theoretical implications of the pillars to establish 
how 4IR has or may impact the nature of diplomacy as it is traditionally known and 
referred to. Although this chapter will make reference to some examples, the following 
chapter will focus on practical implications in the respective pillars.  
3.2 Communication 
The integration of 4IR technologies into diplomacy has resulted in a change in the ways 
diplomats and heads of states communicate with one another and with citizens, 
domestically and abroad.  ICTs, AI and sentiment analysis have been instrumental in 
changing the face of communication and interpreting such communications. This section 
explores the use of social media applications, instant language translation, virtual 
assistants, digital propaganda and real-time communication. Three main areas are 
prioritised as focal points in this sub-section: digital diplomacy, hashtag diplomacy and 
digital propaganda. These topics are relevant to communication as all three discuss 
engagement between two or more parties. In addition, digital propaganda is a 
communicative act where a message is extended from one party, such as the state, to 
another (Briant, 2015).  
3.2.1 Digital diplomacy  
Bekenova and Collins (2019), state that new technologies have allowed for the 
coexistence of multiple actors and ‘multiway’ engagements, irrespective of territorial 
borders and hierarchies. This highlights a crucial feature of digital diplomacy where 
governments are able to gain the confidence of target audiences and build trust-based 
relationships with them. The use of social media for governmental processes, and more 
specifically in the area of foreign affairs, has had a domino effect on states where it is 
now uncommon for a state to not have a social media page for public engagement.  
Manor and Segev (2015), discuss the conceptualisation of digital diplomacy and its rise 
in international relations, highlighting that it operates at two levels. First, digital diplomacy 
occurs at the level of the MFA, and second, at embassies. By operating at these two 
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levels, governments are able to tailor their foreign policy accordingly to suit their history, 
traditions, values and culture. Potter (2002), emphasises the role played by social media, 
the internet and mobile devices in diplomatic practice. As previously highlighted, 
President Trump utilises Twitter to engage with other leaders and illustrate his position 
on particular situations (Shim Jae Hoon, 2017). However, there is no regulation on this 
very public type of diplomacy.  
Fisher (2013), acknowledges the benefits of digital diplomacy which include reduced 
costs, real-time communication, and the ability to share varying content that reaches a 
wider audience through social media. However, the negative implications cannot be 
ignored. Due to the instantaneous nature of communication, states do not have the time 
to adequately prepare their response to situations in times of crisis. Other implications 
include cyber threats such as hacking and private information being leaked (Manor, 
2015). Lastly, anonymity on the internet poses major concerns as users are freely able 
to mistreat, attack and threaten without major consequences due to their unknown 
identity online (Yakovenko, 2012). 
Manor (2017), acknowledges the experimental efforts of states with digital technologies 
that have now led to digital diplomacy becoming an official, and indefinite, aspect of 
diplomacy. Manor (2018) cites the use of WhatsApp groups by the UN to coordinate UN-
related initiatives and keep delegates up to date with their progress, highlighting that the 
use of WhatsApp has been a beneficial tool in diplomatic processes, increasing 
communication times significantly. Manor (2017), explains that the use of digital 
technologies in diplomatic processes does not simply encompass new processes 
introduced by new technologies but also, ultimately, leads to the promotion of new norms 
regarding diplomacy and introduces new behaviour.  
According to Bjola and Pamment (2018:2), states, and more specifically,  MFAs, have 
already begun using digital tools in multiple ways for the sake of diplomatic relations or 
activities, by bridging the gap between the home and host states of their citizens, to 
improving relations with allied countries. Digital technologies are also used by states to 
‘pierce, penetrate and perforate’ political information to achieve desired results. This act 
has been coined digital propaganda, which will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
Adesina (2017), makes a strong case for how ICTs have illustrated, and continue to 
illustrate, how they may have the ability to transform the conduct of diplomacy. First, ICTs 
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have major effects on diplomacy such as altering the forms of communication and 
information exchange resulting in a continuously evolving political, social and economic 
environment. Adesina continues by highlighting how the use of social media, like 
Facebook and Twitter, allows for unmediated and ‘open conversation spaces’ where 
engagement between users is constantly occurring. ICTs have allowed for multiway 
engagements where citizens directly engage with diplomats and heads of states on 
social media platforms.  
While social media presents indefinite opportunities for states, it also introduces 
difficulties, specifically in policymaking for the regulation of such online platforms. Evans 
and Commins (2017) emphasise that thus far, and for decades to come, social media 
may be used for both pure and ill intentions, as it is a  space used to gain traction for 
political movements and the recruitment of members for terrorist organisations, as 
highlighted by the infamous #BlackLivesMatter movement that gained international 
attention. Mansour (2018:97), explores the use of social media by the terrorist group of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The cost-effective and mostly accessible use 
of the internet has allowed ISIS to weaponise social media platforms, like Twitter, to 
attract new members, spread the ideologies of the organisation and psychologically 
influence individuals. Despite rapid advances in technologies that enables internet 
censorship, ISIS has remained resilient and flexible.  
Hocking and Melissen (2015), state that social media allows for a more inclusive 
policymaking process as a greater number of individuals have access to and engage on 
social media platforms. However, the new wave of increased participation may allow for 
false presentation as individuals may sign online petitions but not have more meaningful 
participation than this. The use of platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have allowed 
citizens to actively voice their opinion, granting governments a greater understanding of 
public opinion and demands. Finlayson (2019), acknowledges that unregulated social 
media engagement allows for harassment and verbal abuse.  
According to Feiner (2019), Twitter has taken a bold step in regulating and flagging 
offensive tweets by world leaders. Twitter critically flags influential accounts that happen 
to be government officials or individuals running for office. The accounts are verified and 
consist of 100 000 or more followers. Twitter has said that accounts that match these 
characteristics will be flagged for content that breaks its regulations in the matter of 
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bullying or abusive behaviour. In addition, this drastic step taken by Twitter also ensures 
that there is no reflection of political bias of the application. The platform has recognised 
that some tweets may be of public interest but if it may be considered offensive, the 
application will place a notice on the tweet that users will have to click on before opening 
the tweet.  
Unfortunately, there is a significantly large amount of fake accounts, or ‘bots’, on social 
media that may negatively affect online discourses, leading to a false understanding of 
public opinion on social media. Corcoran (2020) states that bots and fake accounts are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated and it was difficult to distinguish real accounts from 
fake ones. Corcoran (2020) lists the five ways to determine if an account is real or fake, 
as suggested by social media expert, Jason Simms. Five features may be considered: 
the availability of a profile photo; if the name seems real and legitimate; the age of the 
account; the number of followers the account has; and the content that is covered by the 
account.  
While sifting through accounts one by one may be a time-consuming and inefficient 
process, Zaidi (2017), explains the use of algorithmic applications and websites, like 
Botometer and Botornot, to assess the probability of followers being bots. The algorithmic 
processes identify which accounts are bots and class the accounts categorically. 
Botornot explores six features and the more features met by the account, the higher the 
probability of the account being a bot. The features include sentiment, network; user; 
friends; content and temporal. Although this process is not perfect and Zaidi hopes for a 
‘super smart’ system in future, this process may be more efficient for governments aiming 
to understand public opinion and eliminating the contributions made by fake accounts 
that may falsely distort public opinion and negatively impact decision-making processes.  
AI-driven sentiment analysis allows for social media analytics where human opinions and 
attitudes towards a particular topic can be judged using a five-step algorithmic process 
of: 1) information gathering, 2) sentiment recognition, 3) feature selection, 4) 
categorisation,  and 5) calculation of sentiment dissipation (Battacharyya, Chakraborty 
and Hassanien, 2019).  
McLellan (2015), explores sentiment analysis, particularly reviewing feedback for 
business through Twitter. The author highlights that Twitter consists of three Vs (Volume, 
Velocity, and Variety). In terms of velocity, businesses or in this case, governments, 
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require ‘real-time data’ to receive ‘real-time results’. Twitter consists of millions of users 
and therefore has volume; and lastly, the popular social media application consists of 
variety where thousands of topics are discussed from all corners of the world.  
Figure 3: Sentiment analysis process of Twitter data 
 
 (McLellan, 2017) 
3.2.2 Digital propaganda  
Briant (2015), defines propaganda as purposefully manipulated information in the form 
of text, images, video or speech with the aim of persuading an audience in a particular 
direction of thought, feelings or actions. Nicolson (1969:92), discusses propaganda as a 
distasteful inclusion of appealing to the public through media in matters of international 
public policy. Nicolson goes on to accuse Bismarck and his accomplices of purposefully 
distorting information to influence public opinion, a common practice in public diplomacy 
today.  
Very early on, Nicolson (1969), warned of the consequences of ‘wireless’ propaganda. 
First, propaganda may be harmful to diplomatic relations by distorting public opinion and 
taking away from the privacy aspect of diplomatic relations. In addition, those that engage 
with false, distorted content may become victims to it, and lastly, the use of propaganda 
may be a costly tool as Nicolson cites that Germany had previously spent roughly £5 
million on foreign propaganda, at the time of publication. It remains a very large aspect 
of the state’s budget with Russia spending US$500 million on foreign propaganda 
through media, in recent years (Bershidsky, 2015).  
Briant and Wanless (2018:49), raise a point of concern as new technologies and 
propaganda intersect, highlighting that while previously individuals would only consume 
‘propagandistic messages’, individuals now have the option to openly engage with the 
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content, furthermore Briant and Wanless (2018), state that the new- found abilities for 
engagement between citizens and propaganda must be investigated and analysed to 
understand the possible consequences it may result in.  
Deep-fakes, that is AI-driven machine-learning algorithms, may also be used in 
propaganda attempts to falsely distort public opinion or ruin the image of an individual or 
state. The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (2019), describes deep-fakes as 
purposefully manipulated digital or audio content to falsely portray or present an 
individual, object or environment. It may take the form of speech synthesis or facial 
replacement, generation or re-enactment. While deep-fakes may previously have been 
easily detectable, with improved technological capabilities, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to distinguish what is real and what is fake, as has been highlighted in a recent 
iteration of the annual US Congressional Research Service Report (2019).  
Bettilyon (2018), claims that the ability to distort and control information is currently the 
‘most powerful’ that it has ever been; an indefinite threat to democracy and international 
relations. Furthermore, as technology becomes increasingly advanced and available, 
deep-fakes no longer remain just in the realm of hackers and ICT geniuses but can be 
employed by the average citizen to weaponise any piece of public information. Bettilyon 
does, however, highlight that video distortion does have limitations and major distortions 
depend on a computer’s capabilities that may not always allow for the most advanced 
algorithmic models.  
Westerlund (2019), explores the consequences of deep-fakes for states, noting that it 
may pose a threat to both international security and international relations. Examples of 
deep-fakes may be distorted videos where a head of state or ambassador makes racist 
or hateful comments or where the military of a state is performing beheadings on a 
particular ethnic group. In 2019, in attempting a military coup of the Gabonese 
government, a deep-fake of President Ali Bango was shared. The video illustrated an 
unwell Bango and negatively contributed to an already politically hostile environment 
(Raj, 2020). This may lead to conflicting diplomatic relations and a tense international 
community where states may hastily withdraw from international agreements and allied 
organisations.  
Deep-fakes may be used to incite violence, ruin or falsely accredit the reputation of 
individuals or states at large, spread and promote hate speech, and blackmail individuals 
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or organisations, as mentioned above and it is becoming increasingly advanced. Naffi 
(2020) insists that the only way to curb deep-fakes and reduce the belief of false 
information is for states to equip citizens with the appropriate skills and knowledge to 
detect deep-fakes and for them to have the ability to distinguish factual information from 
falsely distorted images, videos or speech recordings.  
3.2.3 Hashtag diplomacy 
Doctor (2013), explains the manner in which a hashtag works, stating that topics are 
categorically arranged allowing users to easily identify particular discussions of interest 
and engage with them. Furthermore, the use of the hashtag on social media allows for 
an ‘inner circle’ – no matter how small or big that circle may be – meaning all interested 
members can engage from all corners of the world with common interests in mind. 
Manor (n.d.), suggests that the use of hashtags by governments and organisations is in 
an attempt to build their public image or illustrate their position on a particular topic. This 
illustrates a new era of public diplomacy. Bjola and Pamment (2019), state that both state 
and non-state actors rely on digital diplomacy for a myriad of reasons, such as promoting 
an agenda or for recruitment purposes. 
Hitchings-Hales and Calderwood (2017), strongly state that social media has a major 
impact on online movements, highlighting the success of #HeForShe; 
#StopFundingHate; and #BringBackOurGirls.  
Digital technologies have the potential for diplomats to amplify their message, indicate 
the interests of their state or the state’s position on a particular matter. Hocking and 
Melissen (2015), highlight that states do not necessarily need social media to achieve 
the foreign policy goals of the state but have come to favour the platform as it opens up 
a world of communication, projects the message of the state and may assist the state in 
its diplomatic missions.  
By selecting the ‘like’ or ‘retweet’ option, an individual, organisation or state demonstrates 
their support on a specific matter. According to Bjola and Pamment (2019), hashtags 
allow online conversations and may assist topics or movements in gaining traction as it 
builds a discussion on a theme and it is tailored to a target audience. Not only does the 
use of hashtags demonstrate an individual or organisation’s position on a matter but it 





As the world is currently the most interconnected that it has ever been and continuous 
breakthroughs occur in technology and science, collaboration is key. International 
cooperation should occur between states, governments, MNCs and private interest 
groups or think tanks. Science and technology diplomacy are the collaborative efforts 
amongst state and non-state actors for the purpose of scientific and technological 
advancement and improving international relations, therefore it is a key area of the 
interdependence pillar (Yakushiji, 2009). This section explores the possibilities and depth 
of interdependence and cooperation through science and technology diplomacy, further 
exploring science for diplomacy, diplomacy for sciencFe and science in diplomacy.  
3.3.1 Science and technology diplomacy  
As previously highlighted by Hennessy (2019), science diplomacy encompasses the 
scientific collaborative relations among states. Cunningham (2003), highlights the 
intersection of scientific, technological and diplomatic fields, expressing that science and 
diplomacy are becoming a central part of international negotiations. Van Langenhove 
(2019), explains that scientific-diplomatic relations have been around for decades but 
were not classified as such as the term was only coined later on citing, for example, the 
joint efforts of the US and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for space 
exploration. The ascent of science diplomacy in the last decade may be attributed to the 
strides made in science and technology that have transformed communication channels, 
the nature of daily tasks and opened a door to development for many developing states.  
The Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy (2019), explores the advantages of 
science diplomacy which are wide-spanning and diverse. First, science diplomacy 
promotes cooperation to address global challenges such as terrorism and climate 
change. It also creates more sustainable conditions for scientific activities as more states 
integrate science and technology into their foreign policies. This inevitably leads to an 
evidence-based foreign policy. The benefits are not exclusive to foreign policy but also 
extend to public policy as there is a smoother integration of science and policy.  
Roig (2018), describes diplomacy as a soft power that promotes participation, peace and 
alliances. In addition, it can reduce hostility. As technology and science have come to 
play a significant role in international relations, MFAs do not consist of diplomats and 
international relations advisors exclusively. Scientific expert advisors have become an 
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integral aspect of the MFA, tasked with exploring how technology, science and innovation 
can be advanced. The inclusion of scientific advisors may prove to be extremely 
beneficial to a diplomat whose skills and knowledge are rooted in the field of international 
relations and diplomacy. A diplomat may experience difficulties attempting to integrate 
aspects of science and technology into diplomacy, especially considering the rapid 
development in the era of 4IR.  
According to Yukushji (2009:7), science diplomacy is mutually beneficial and 
‘empowering’. The benefits of engaging in science diplomacy are not limited to a single 
actor but rather extend to all who partake in it, leading to the formation of cooperative 
agreements between states and non-state actors. Turekian et al., (2018), highlight that 
smaller and developing states have witnessed the significant value that science and 
technology holds, further assisting some states in positioning their state in a more 
favourable light in the international society.  
3.3.1.1 Diversities of science diplomacy 
The Royal Society (2010), outlines the three diversities of science diplomacy  realising 
how science can assist states in achieving their foreign policy objectives. This does not 
exclude the possibility that science and technology may have made contributions to 
diplomacy in previous decades but rather highlights that this contribution may be much 
greater in recent years due to the innovations in science and technology. The three 
aspects are categorised as ‘science for diplomacy’, ‘diplomacy for science’, and ‘science 
in diplomacy’. This highlights that there are different ways in which science may 
contribute to diplomacy or diplomacy may contribute to science.  
Turekian et al., (2017), critique the Royal Society’s (2010) variations of science 
diplomacy, describing them as limiting and more theoretical in nature which may make 
them better suited exclusively in academia rather than in government. The alternatives 
proposed by Turekian et al., (2017), are: ‘actions designed to directly advance a country’s 
needs’, ‘actions designed to address cross-border interests’, and ‘actions primarily 
designed to meet global needs and challenges’. The alternative attempts to be more 
aligned to the state and its actions and allows the possibility for an action to overlap over 
two or more themes. However, at the time of writing this alternative is yet to be popularly 
referred to by states and that of the Royal Society (2010), continues to be a source of 
reference for most researchers, organisations and actors. 
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Table 2: The Royal Society’s diversities of science diplomacy 
Science for Diplomacy Science and technology are utilised as a 
diplomatic tool to improve foreign 
relations between states in the efforts to 
collaborate against cross-border issues.  
Diplomacy for Science  Traditional diplomatic tools are utilised in 
an attempt to equip the state with the 
knowledge of foreign sciences and 
technology to improve national 
capabilities.  
Science in Diplomacy With the input and interests of scientists 
on foreign policy, it may enhance foreign 
policy actions and responses in times of 
war or peace.  
(Van Langenhoven, 2019). 
3.3.1.1.1 Science for diplomacy 
According to the UN (2020), private-public partnerships (PPPs) will be crucial in 
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) using big data. The international 
organisation aims to improve transparency and reduce but ultimately avoid the abuse of 
human rights and the invasion of privacy, within states and among states.  
Two notable initiatives directed by the UN and its secretary-general include, but are not 
limited to, the Cape Town Global Action Plan for Sustainable Data that took place in 2017 
and the UN Global Pulse. The Global Pulse is driven by data science and is geared at 
promoting awareness of big data-related opportunities for sustainable development and 
humanitarian assistance. In addition, Global Pulse aims to develop ‘high-impact 
analytics’ for the UN and governments through networks strictly covering data science, 






Figure 4: Big data for sustainable development 
 
(UN Global Pulse, 2017).  
Above, Figure 4 presents how big data may be used to achieve the UN’s SDGs (UN 
Global Pulse, 2017). Particularly relevant to ‘Science for Diplomacy’ is ‘Climate Action’ 
and ‘Life Below Water’. In reference to ‘climate action’, deforestation is a major 
transnational issue, according to Dean (2019), who explains how large forests such as 
the Amazon store carbon and when such forests are torn down or burned down to create 
industrialised sites, carbon is released into the air as carbon dioxide. Global Pulse 
suggests that through big data, states and international organisations may closely track 
deforestation utilising ‘satellite imagery, crowd-sourced witness accounts, and open 
data’. It is evident that through collaborative efforts and big data, states may address 
cross-border issues.   
Global Pulse (2017) suggests that big data can be used to establish ‘illegal,unreported 
and unregulated’ (IUU) fishing activity. Emmert (2018), highlights that machine-learning 
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techniques have allowed for more accurate and sophisticated techniques through 
satellite tracking where the global footprint of fishing can be traced from space and further 
track the movement of illegal shipping vessels.  
3.3.1.1.2 Diplomacy for science  
According to Van Langenhove (2019), diplomacy for science involves utilising traditional 
diplomatic tools to equip a state with the appropriate knowledge of science and 
technology to improve national capabilities. Science offers the opportunity to bridge the 
gap between states that have previously had weaker political associations (Royal 
Society, 2010).  
Boyd et al., (2019), discuss diplomacy for data and argue that data has become an 
integral aspect of diplomacy as data-driven AI technologies become increasingly popular 
and integrated into diplomatic practice. Data has become a transformative tool that has 
the power to drive or trigger change. Notable types of data that may be relevant to 
diplomatic practice include geographical, natural, financial and meteorological data. 
Science diplomacy, and specifically diplomacy for science, may be a key driver behind 
4IR as scientific partnerships and collaborations have produced innovative discoveries 
and resulted in tremendous scientific advances. Flatten (2019), cites the success of the 
‘Synchroton Light and Middle East’, also known as the SESAME project that unites 
researchers focusing on archaeology, environmental sciences and physics, to name a 
few. 4 
3.3.1.1.3 Science in diplomacy  
Science in diplomacy may be the most comprehensive variety of all three. It draws on 
soft power as it is both attractive and influential as a national asset as highlighted by the 
Royal Society (2010). In addition, it further provides different types of science in 
diplomacy such as: new institutions; educational opportunities; track-two diplomacy; 
science cooperation agreements; and international science exhibitions.  
New institutions are designed to assist states in achieving the scientific goals of 
diplomacy and requires international collaboration that may include governments, non-
profit organisations, and private corporations (Royal Society, 2010).  
 
4 Partners of the SESAME project include Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Cyprus, Pakistan, Egypt and Palestine 
(Flatten, 2019).  
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Educational opportunities attempt to create, enhance and build international 
partnerships, often between two or more states in the efforts of expanding or building on 
long-term knowledge-based relations to sustain a particular field, as stated by the Royal 
Society (2010).  
Track-two diplomacy was coined by Montville (1987). It may be understood as individuals 
that do not form part of the ‘official negotiation and mediation process’, such as scientists 
(Royal Society, 2010:12). Such individuals are regarded as credible and possess 
significant influence as Lieberfeld (2002), states that these individuals should be heavily 
credited for achieving official political, track-one, agreements. 
Scientific cooperation agreements are defined as scientific agreements among states 
may provide a sense of hope that improved political relations are on the horizon, as 
stated by the Royal Society (2010).  
Lastly, the Royal Society (2010) states that international science festivals and exhibitions 
are another display of science in diplomacy, explaining that science festivals and 
exhibitions highlight the historical aspect of science, in addition to its borderless nature 
where states and non-state actors may share common interests.  
3.4 Domestic and international legal frameworks  
While 4IR technologies have been mostly welcomed into diplomatic practice, there is no 
international law that legislates its use. It is argued that some aspects, like the use of 
newly built autonomous weapons are automatically catered for in the same legislation 
that guides other weapons. However, this is not the case for the technologies specifically 
utilised for diplomatic purposes. The VCDR of 1961 is the only document that legislates 
all aspects of diplomatic practice but since its inception, tremendous strides have been 
made in the way in which diplomacy is practiced and how diplomats conduct themselves. 
This section aims to determine the usefulness of the VCDR of 1961 given the current 
nature of diplomacy and further explores other possible documents that may legislate 
diplomatic practice given the recent rise of technology in the field of diplomacy.  
According to Turekian et al., (2017), the rapid growth and continuous development of 
technologies presents growing challenges to security and foreign policy, on a national 
and international level. Therefore, states have to take a bilateral and multilateral 
approach to developing protocols surrounding cybersecurity and ungovernable spaces, 
like the internet.  
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Technologies like AI are complex and have cemented its place in international relations, 
in areas such as decision-making, military forces and communication. Therefore, Gill 
(2019), suggests that the legislation of AI cannot be done only by coders, scientists, 
industries or states independently but rather in collaboration with one another. The 
governance of advanced technologies like AI ought to be done by all central players to 
avoid overlooking key aspects of legislation and potential implications. However, apart 
from the importance of legislating AI, equally significant is its implementation. All states 
and non-state actors, such as industries, international and civil-based organisations and 
innovators have to be tasked with the responsibility of executing the governance of AI.   
Edelman (2020) states that to begin the process of regulating AI, it is important for all 
policymakers and states to acknowledge that it is a tool with an immeasurable amount 
of uses, therefore it is not the tool that must be regulated but rather the ways in which it 
is used. Edelman recommends that states should work on tailoring AI policies at the 
national level for use in the public and private sector. Internationally, states should 
explore existing technology-related policies and work from there, ensuring that the 
benefits and risks posed by AI are evaluated on all scales and in all areas of the 
international economy and in national economies. However, Edelman (2020) notes that 
it is not possible to adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ but that policies should rather be 
implemented on an area-specific basis.  
The Royal Society (2010:23), explores Governance of International Spaces that looks to 
regulate the spaces beyond national borders such as the high seas, Antarctica, and outer 
space. There are valid concerns over international spaces that cannot be governed 
through traditional modes of diplomacy and governance. It is therefore imperative that 
more agile modes of enforcing international collaboration and cooperation ought to be 
pursued through ‘scientific evidence and underpinned by practical scientific 
partnerships’. 
It is rumoured that Russia has already begun utilising unmanned robotics in real-life 
urban scenarios. This comes after Russia confirmed to Forbes that in the near future, it 
intends to replace human soldiers with unmanned robots to save human life from 
dangerous and life-threatening situations (Spry, 2020). In addition, Spry (2020) states 
that Russia has confirmed that its robotic soldiers will be ‘faster, stronger and infinitely 
more accurate’. Hambling (2019) states that the US army is also successfully creating 
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robotic soldiers that can understand and interpret instructions as well as perform tasks, 
ask questions and provide reports. The research team involved in their development has 
explained that it has utilised a hybrid approach in their design, relying on deep learning 
for image recognition and object identification. However, the design team continues to 
deal with two challenges: the slowness of the robots and the need for resilience.  
Garcia (2018), argues that lethal and militarised AI may create detrimental effects in 
international security and stability, possibly infringing on Article 2.4 of the UN Charter that 
deals with peaceful resolutions in times of dispute. Singer (2009) raises two imperative 
questions: 1) should an AI-led arms race be prevented before it begins? and 2) should 
AI be designed to effectively destroy and kill without human input? Kirkpatrick (2016), 
states that autonomous weapons driven by AI should be utilised in conjunction with 
human input and cannot act independently.  
There are mixed responses about the militarisation of AI but what remains is that there 
is no existing legislation that speaks to the regulation of AI and autonomous weapons in 
international relations. Michaelsons (nd), explains that although states have made some 
legislative provision for the use of AI, it is not sufficient due to the fast-paced development 
of AI. There is a desperate need for universal law but it is imperative to ensure a balance 
between the protection of citizens and the encouragement of innovation. According to 
Azoulay (nd), the UN and its advisory bodies have been working on and submitting 
reports and declarations regarding the ethics and use of AI. The IO has played a crucial 
role in regulating previous technological advancements such as the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) and the Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights (1997).  
 Garcia (2018), expresses concern that the use of autonomous weapons will infringe on 
the currently relied upon frameworks that guide the use of military weapons and suggests 
that militarised AI may result in more violence. However, Kirckpatrick (2016), provides 
the opinion of experienced military officers who claim that the use of AI will decrease the 
number of mistakes made in combat due to improved accuracy and a lack of emotions 
that may cloud judgement. 
To uphold peace and security within the international society, the legislation of AI must 
be ‘innovative and agile’ (Gill, 2019). This may ensure that legislation is continuously 
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updated to keep abreast of AI developments and that at no single moment will 
international security be vulnerable to AI.  
3.4.1 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961  
While the VCDR of 1961 was, and continues to be, a key document guiding international 
diplomatic law, its relevance may be questioned in an era where communication has 
drastically evolved and the traditional methods of diplomatic relations are no longer 
utilised. With communication being a key aspect of diplomacy as emphasised by Spies 
(2016:39), it is without a doubt going to be affected by 4IR where communication is an 
integral component of change.  
Further, Wouter and Duquet (2012) raise the important concern of the VCDR and the 
actors  it refers to, this being exclusively states. Therefore, the document does not take 
non-state diplomatic actors, such as the European Union (EU), into consideration and 
raises the question: is the current VCDR of 1961 enough to guide diplomatic relations for 
both state and non-state actors?  
In addition, the VCDR states that one of its sole drivers is to ensure and maintain peace 
and security in the international society.  Ensuring security in the present day differs from 
previously when the cyber dimension did not exist as it does today. The VCDR of 1961 
also outlines the special privileges and immunities that a diplomat, head of state and their 
family members are entitled to. With new threats emergent over the last few decades 
such as cyber threats and attacks, it must be questioned if such privileges and immunities 
remain appropriate. 
3.4.2 The use of 4IR in diplomatic communication  
The symbolic act of diplomatic missions between sending and receiving states always 
formed an integral aspect of diplomatic relations. Berridge (2015:155) discusses resident 
embassies, highlighting that historically their purpose was mostly a matter of 
convenience to not only minimise the costs of frequent travel but also the risks this 
entailed. It also aided diplomats in the opportunity to better understand a state when 
residing in it and to adequately prepare them for negotiations. Berridge (2015:156) notes 
that initially states were extremely reluctant, afraid diplomats would act as spies  and 
note the receiving state’s inadequacies. However, soon the art of permanent diplomatic 
missions and resident embassies became a significant element of diplomatic relations.   
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Berridge (2015), highlights that embassies have survived the transports and 
communications revolutions due to their immense importance in diplomatic relations, 
however, noting that some states have become more restrictive and withdrawn due to 
costs and other factors. Cucos (2012) discusses how embassies have been closing down 
and governments have chosen virtual diplomacy as an alternative. Although this option 
carries complications, it poses significant implications for international relations as 
diplomatic missions are a crucial aspect in international relations, promoting and building 
trade and economic ties and the physical meeting between two states is imperative. 
Furthermore, public diplomacy has become an integral aspect of diplomacy in building 
and maintaining educational and cultural exchanges between states. However, the 
addition of new technologies should not supplement traditional embassies but rather 
complement them and improve the services they may offer or expand their reach in 
smaller regions.  
Cucos (2012), further discusses the need for governments to seek alternative courses of 
action when closing down embassies. For the US, that alternative has been a virtual 
embassy which comes in the form of a website where e-services are available. This 
method was utilised specifically in Tehran, Iran, when the US embassy closed down. 
Diplo Foundation (2007), discusses the Maldives and the launch of the first virtual 
embassy which was described as an ‘online space’ to create and allow for new forums 
for diplomatic representation and negotiation.  
Tavares (2018), describes virtual embassies as a wholesome source of information 
regarding political, economic and trade news. Over and above, the virtual embassy 
should also provide a plethora of the necessary e-services such as educational 
opportunities, visa applications, assisting with stolen or lost passports and retrieving 
personal information. Lastly, the platform should consist of remote communications of 
important information like travel restrictions and the latest developments between the 
host and home countries, this is especially significant in hostile periods.  
Although the virtual embassy is a great tool on paper, allowing most individuals  instant 
access to their state’s e-services, it may sometimes be used as a tool by rebellious 
states. This is precisely what Iran did in 2011, just two days after the US’s virtual embassy 
was launched (Reuters, 2011): the Iranian government blocked access to the website 
after it was unhappy with decisions made by the US government and retaliated how it 
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felt was most appropriate. However, blocking access to such a site poses concerns, 
especially for US citizens in Iran. With decades of non-diplomatic relations between Iran 
and the US, the virtual embassy was off to a shaky start. 
Communication has always been a key pillar of international relations and diplomacy 
(Spies, 2016:39), and it has even been emphasised in the VCDR (1961:8). Article 27 of 
the VCDR states the importance of diplomats being able to protect free information during 
an official mission, whether through coding and ciphering, or the use of wireless 
transmitters. 
The use of coding and ciphers highlights that states used technologies to their advantage 
to protect information and regulate diplomatic activities. Article 27 of the VCDR (1961) 
makes reference to wireless transmitters which were historically more unknown and 
difficult to get a hold of as technology was not as advanced as it is today, however, it was 
a key aspect of protecting information. Today, the very essence of 4IR is faster, wireless 
and involves more enhanced communication and communication technologies allowing 
for the free flow of communication and its protection (Kunst et al., 2019:2). 
Ehiane and Mosud (2013) explore the integration of ICT into diplomacy, stating that ICT 
is a profound and strategic tool for communication and collaboration. Therefore, 
integration may yield positive results for diplomatic relations. Furthermore, if correctly 
utilised, ICT may assist states, and more so developing states, to manage diplomatic 
issues that may constantly emerge such as an unclear line of communication between 
states or states and citizens.   
Accessibility and reliance on technological applications, such as Skype, have allowed for 
diplomats and heads of states to have instant, albeit virtual, face-to-face communication 
via video calls (Ehiane and Mosud, 2013). This may save MFAs time and money, where 
previously long and costly trips were required for diplomatic engagement to occur. 
Although in-person contact remains a crucial element of diplomacy, virtual meetings may 
be utilised when in-person contact is not possible.  
The latest technologies have also introduced applications pertaining to instant language 
translation which may be extremely beneficial when heads of states or diplomats engage 
with one another but language poses as a barrier to engagement. In January 2019, 
Google launched its very own instant language translator that Titcomb (2019) describes 
as a ‘game-changer’ for tourists. At the time of the launch, the application had the ability 
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to instantaneously translate 27 languages. Titcomb explains that all that is required is for 
an individual to speak in their native language and select the language that their phrase, 
comment or statement ought to be translated into. However, as useful as instant 
language translation may be, it may take away from the personal element of diplomacy 
and conversations may lose their meaning. Furthermore, diplomats are often required to 
use charisma to achieve desirable outcomes, which is at risk of being lost in translation 
with the use of applications.  
3.5 New ‘new’ diplomacy  
The previous section reflected on the two phases of diplomacy, old and new diplomacy. 
Both phases embody specific characteristics, styles and features which make it 
respectively unique. In addition, old and new diplomacy represent an era of diplomatic 
theory and practice over a specific time period. Upon reflection of the two phases, it 
simultaneously highlights the evolution of diplomacy and how it became influenced by 
specific trends and developments, such as the influence of APRANET and the rise of the 
media. Therefore, new ‘new’ diplomacy may be defined as diplomatic tools and practice 
driven by AI, ICT and big data that assist a state in achieving its foreign policy goals. In 
addition, it may be practiced and influenced by state and non-state actors. This section, 
entitled new ‘new’ diplomacy, attempts to categorise a new phase in diplomatic theory 
and practice, as influenced by 4IR. An exploration of the new actors, new practices and 
a new sense of openness in modern diplomacy is examined, exploring virtual and e-
diplomacy.  
3.5.1 Virtual diplomacy 
Pilegaard (2016), predicts that future practices of diplomacy may potentially be impacted 
by ICT. The US came to realise very early on the significance that technologies may play 
in diplomatic affairs, launching Virtual Presence Posts (VPPs) in the Maldives and 
Russia. VPPs are the extension of diplomatic services and the availability of information 
using ICT to serve a group of citizens that cannot access physical embassies. At the time 
of writing, Nielsen (2007:9) recorded that there were 41 existent VPPs.  The first five 
were established by Russia for illustrative purposes and the VPP in the Maldives was 
designed in the absence of a physical US embassy. The Congressional Service Report 
(2019) explains the purpose of VPPs, highlighting that it may enable diplomatic 
engagement in smaller, yet important, regions.  
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Hocking and Melissen (2015) explore the implications of large datasets, particularly 
referring to big data, on the traditional functions of diplomacy such as the gathering of 
information and analysing datasets for faster and more accurate delivery of information 
and services. This illustrates that the services of e-diplomacy may be drastically 
enhanced by big data. Such enhancements may be vital in times of bilateral conflict and 
crisis management. According to Manzoni (nd), big data offers a wide availability of 
information that can contribute to quick and appropriate decision-making in times of 
crises. 
Bousfield (2019) discusses the upside to horizontal engagements as a result of more 
reliance on ICTs. Horizontal engagement encompasses the ability for ordinary citizens, 
various non-state actors and any user, to engage on online platforms as equals, 
irrespective of the laws or degree of freedoms that their governments allow. However, 
citizens in some states have experienced internet censorship by governments in an 
attempt to deter citizens from online engagement or to prevent citizens from being 
exposed to particular content. Fassihi (2019), recalls how internet censorship has been 
a common practice in Iran where the government shut down the internet in the wake of 
anti-government protests in 2019. In addition, in the decades-long tension-filled 
relationship between Iran and the US, Iran has often shut down the US’s virtual embassy 
in times of conflict, as witnessed in 2011 (Reuters, 2011).  
With developing ICTs, there is also an opportunity to one-up your opponent. During the 
#occupycentral protests that took place in Hong Kong in 2014, citizens were wary of the 
fact that the state may shut down the internet as protests intensified, and so, to ensure 
the momentum and communication continued among citizens and global supporters, 
FireChat was downloaded. FireChat is an application that allows for continuous 
engagement offline, in the absence of the internet (Boehler, 2014). 
3.5.2 E-diplomacy  
Hare (2016:289) states that with the recent technological innovations and the 
communications revolution, e-diplomacy continues to become an increasingly popular 
diplomatic tool for diplomats. As a field, however, it remains in its ‘infancy’.  
According to Hanson (2012), e-diplomacy is the utilisation of the internet and newly 
developed ICT to achieve the diplomatic goals of the state. It is birthed out of connective 
technologies that have digitised different processes and practices of diplomacy, aiding 
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states in knowledge and information management, disaster response and the practice of 
public diplomacy.  
Sandre (2012), notes that while social media may play a key role in e-diplomacy, it is not 
the only tool of this strand of diplomacy. Text messaging, crowdsourcing capabilities, 
mapping software, and mobile and computer technology are all important tools that 
enable a more digitised and efficient diplomacy. While the advancements of technologies 
have resulted in the growth of e-diplomacy, it has also reduced the costs of traditional 
diplomacy. Hare (2016), states that in the last 50 years, the costs of communication 
technologies, computer and mobile devices has dropped dramatically and therefore 
making them more affordable to individuals, states and organisations, making diplomacy 
extremely open and responsive as states and non-state actors openly engage on online 
platforms. 
The continuous developments of communication technologies offer a downside to 
diplomacy and that is its rapid and ever-changing nature (Hare, 2016). As technology 
develops, diplomacy is forced to adapt but it may prove to be a difficult task for diplomats 
and other relevant actors to continuously be equipped with the new skills and knowledge 
pertaining to technological advances.  
Kurbalija (2011), highlights three implications of e-diplomacy. First, the constant growth 
and influence of new technologies have resulted in a continuously evolving environment 
for diplomatic practice. Such advancements have already and continue to affect a 
change in the global economy due to ICT-led advancements. Second, as official 
diplomatic practice has transitioned to online platforms and the use of the internet has 
increased significantly, states have to be increasingly concerned with internet 
governance. And lastly, diplomatic actors ought to consider the new tools of diplomacy, 
such as the internet, finding information that can now easily be done with the use of big 
data and Natural Language Generation (NLP), Processing and Understanding, and the 
use of social media.  
E-diplomacy and its new tools may be utilised by and for multiple diplomatic purposes. 
States may have more consistent and useful engagement with the diaspora, this 
simultaneously enhances the practice of public diplomacy. In times of crises, be it natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks, e-diplomacy allows for instant communication. As 
previously mentioned, the use of technologies may influence decision-making, allowing 
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policymakers, diplomats or heads of states to make better and more accurate decisions 
quicker. In addition, e-diplomacy tools may allow citizens to be part of foreign policy 
decision-making processes (Kurbalija, 2011).  
Al-Mustfah et al., (2018), conducted a comprehensive study on the factors that may 
influence the implementation of e-diplomacy. The study explored social, political and 
economic factors and resulted in a conclusion that there are 18 influential factors, positive 
and negative, that may affect implementation. From the findings of the study, it was 
established that secrecy, resistance to change and finances may hinder the 
implementation of e-diplomacy. Historically, diplomacy is known to be private and closed 
but this has changed over time. However, some diplomats still prefer to keep aspects of 
diplomacy private and therefore their reluctance to share information on online platforms 
may affect implementation. Some actors’ work may be made up of sensitive information 
using complex but traditional processes and failure to adapt may make their department 
obsolete, resulting in these actors becoming resistant to change. The financing of 
technologies for diplomacy may be a large area of concern for many states, especially 
those that do not have excess financial resources. In addition, some states may feel that 
it is not necessary and choose to use their budgets in other areas which may be 
considered of greater priority. Therefore, states may not upgrade to newer systems and 
processes, affecting the implementation of e-diplomacy.  
According to Tavares (2018), dramatic changes ought to occur for diplomacy to remain 
relevant in a highly technologically-driven global environment, detailing the cost-effective 
and agile nature of e-diplomacy. Furthermore, the implementation of e-diplomacy may 
provide and uphold public accountability and enable the good image of the state.  
Hare (2016), suggests that the advanced communication technologies that both 
individuals and governments have access to today offer both opportunities and risks for 
states and diplomatic relations. Positively, states have access to greater outreach with 
foreign audiences, with websites detailing educational opportunities in the US and visa 
applications (Slavin, 2013). However, hackers can easily make threats against 
governments. Following the tensions and airstrikes between the US and Iran in January  
2020, a group of Iranian hackers hacked a US governmental website with an image of a 
distorted and bruised President Trump and a vow to seek revenge for the murder of 
Qassem Suleimani (France-Presse, 2020). 
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3.6 Diplomatic functions  
Technology has changed the composition and execution of daily tasks in virtually every 
field, including that of diplomacy. This section will explore the popularising theme of cyber 
diplomacy and further the role of a diplomat in the 21st century.  
3.6.1 Cyber diplomacy  
According to Barrinha and Renard (2017), cyber diplomacy may be understood as the 
utilisation of diplomatic tools and resources in the cyber domain to pursue foreign policy 
goals and serve the state’s national interests. Hocking and Melissen (2015), refer to 
technological developments and the use of social media by diplomatic actors as a central 
feature of cyber diplomacy. The actors of cyber diplomacy are vast, consisting of 
business leaders of technological industries and companies, international organisations, 
states and interest groups. Diplomatic issues pertaining to the cyber domain include 
cybercrime and security, internet freedom and governance, and confidence building. 
Buck (1998:6) terms cyberspace as a ‘global common’ where citizens and states engage. 
Other global commons are the high seas and outer space. Therefore, the intersection of 
diplomacy and cyberspace may be largely due to the growing need for governing 
structures to regulate the increasing and more formal use of the internet.  
Bousfield (2017:1048), states that the events of 9/11 led to the prioritisation of internet 
governance and security with private and public actors being concerned about securing 
online platforms. With states coming to realise the value of the internet and the outcomes 
that its content may result in, states began to strongly regulate political and social content 
on online platforms to deter unwanted outcomes, such as terrorist attacks or movements 
against the government. This is often done through internet regulation and internet 
censorship.  
While many states have snubbed China for its harsh internet regulations, Canada has 
also implemented similar practices but mostly for the purpose of protecting its citizens 
with state and non-state actors like Internet Search Providers (ISPs) and private search 
engines. Canada’s internet regulation prioritises eliminating criminal elements such as 
online child pornography, whereas China aims to deter social engagement on particular 
topics that go against the Chinese constitution (Diebert, 2012). 
China’s cyber diplomacy is predominantly centred on the state, attempting to utilise 
traditional modes of diplomacy to pursue regulation (Bousfield, 2017). The Chinese 
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government utilises UN legislation, such as the Internet Government Forum to enforce 
its right to regulate the internet. The large jurisdiction of the UN allows China to freely 
and widely implement its cyber diplomacy. However, the continuously developing nature 
of ICT infrastructure may pose significant challenges in the regulation aspect of a state’s 
cyber diplomacy and may dictate the future of such regulations and practice.  
Digital Watch (2020), states that the IoT poses particular security risks with IoT tools 
becoming increasingly popular in the case of cyberattacks and while the private sector 
has taken the lead in curbing such attacks, it does not have the resources or capabilities 
to fight such battles alone. In addition, governments and public sector organisations have 
increasingly become targets of IoT-led cyberattacks. According to Orr (2020), 
cyberattacks against government and governmental organisations have increased by 
65% since 2019. Swivel Secure (2020), recalls the biggest cyberattacks on governments 
since 2011, noting that they have become increasingly detrimental over time with 
improved technologies.  
3.6.2 A diplomat in the era of 4IR 
According to Bull (1977), diplomats are tasked with the responsibility of socialising the 
relationships between actors while simultaneously promoting the norms, rules and values 
within the international society. Nicolson (1998), lists the characteristics of a great 
diplomat, stating that they have to be charming, unbiased to classes in societies, patient, 
courteous, able to speak multiple and popular foreign languages, have a good memory, 
and be truthful. 
Ambassador Al-Alawi (2019), discusses the more functional characteristics historically 
known, such as negotiation and representation skills, protecting the interests of citizens 
in the diaspora, and the ability to gather, analyse and distribute information. However, 
Al-Alawi continues by emphasising how imperative it is for diplomats to acquire the 
appropriate training to adequately perform their duties. The ambassador acknowledges 
how the forms of communication and information gathering are evolving, particularly 
highlighting the importance of Data Mining5, and its implications for how diplomats may 
appropriately process large quantities of information.  
 
5 Data mining is the ‘exploration and analysis’ of huge datasets to establish informational patterns and trends 
(Microstrategy, 2020). In addition, data mining powers AI-led applications, such as search engines.  
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As technology enhances the process of diplomacy, it automatically enhances the role of 
a diplomat and their ability to gather and share information in a timely and relevant 
manner. Hutchings and Suri (2020), state that this allows diplomats to ‘micromanage’ 
diplomatic relations and information, irrespective of distance. However, the rapid 
availability of information from different sources may diminish the reporting role of a 
diplomat. As aforementioned, ICT is available to all who can access it and all who can 
afford it. Therefore, the minute an event, crisis or attack takes place, it may be publicised. 
Within seconds, the world is aware of the events that have occurred. This is unlike 
previously where diplomats would provide formal reports informing parties about the 
events that have taken place. However, as much as the information has already been 
shared, the diplomat ought to confirm the facts of the information as true events may be 
falsely distorted.  
Bjola (2019), explains that in using AI as a tool for diplomacy, the diplomat’s role and 
daily functions may be enhanced. Meier (2016), believes that such tools include 
hashtags, that may easily group topics of engagement on social media and allow 
diplomats to understand the views of citizens. Grottola (2018), states that AI may improve 
negotiation processes for diplomats as it may be utilised in analysing past negotiation 
scenarios and exploring the outcomes rather than making decisions based purely on 
facts and understanding at the time in the hopes of a particular outcome.  Cranston 
(2011), acknowledges that new tools may enhance a diplomat’s daily activities and 
reduce the time used for such activities significantly but raises concerns regarding the 
time it may take to train diplomats in how to use new tools. In addition, as technology is 
continuously being improved and new tools that may be provided to improve the work of 
a diplomat may need updating every few months, how does a state ensure diplomats 
keep up with constantly evolving trends?  
Swissnex, a network created by the Swiss government, is an international science and 
technology initiative that aims to exchange knowledge and talent (Swissnex Network, 
2020). The organisation consists of offices in five innovative hubs around the world, 
including Bangalore, San Francisco and Boston. The network describes the four primary 
practices of their organisation as: the promotion of Swiss higher education, tech start-
ups and research institutions; inspire innovative and fresh ideas prompted by the 
exchange of knowledge; and examine and advise on scientific, technological and/or 
educational opportunities and trends. According to Tavares (2020), Swissnex is a leading 
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organisation responsible for training diplomats on knowledge and skills pertaining to 
technology and innovation to ensure diplomats are equipped to deal with modern and 
digitised challenges and use such skills to improve diplomatic practice.  
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the implications of 4IR on the pillars on diplomacy. Each pillar 
represents a subsection, yet integral, aspect of diplomacy which is expected to be widely 
affected by 4IR. Communication, interdependence, domestic and international legal 
frameworks, new ‘new’ diplomacy and diplomatic functions have all been critically 
discussed. In conclusion, it may be stated that technological advancements allow for a 
smoother line and enhanced process of communication. Digital diplomacy has taken a 
more frequent front in diplomatic relations. However, technologies do pose negative 
implications for international relations as it drastically hastens the required response time 
of a state in times of conflict or natural disaster. In addition, deep-fakes may negatively 
affect the public image of the state which may hinder public diplomacy. The section which 
explores interdependence highlights that international cooperation is key in various 
forms, such as educational opportunities abroad and research collaborations. 
Furthermore, international cooperation prompted by technology may assist in more 
states harnessing the complete potential of 4IR and address global challenges which are 
a key aspect of science diplomacy. In reference to legislation, states have taken some 
steps to regulate the use of AI but mostly to protect the privacy of a citizen. There is 
currently no legislation that guides the use of AI in international relations. As it stands, 
there has only been reports and recommendations by organisations and private think 
tanks.  The pillars of new ‘new’ diplomacy and diplomatic functions are very similar and 
may overlap in some instances. New ‘new’ diplomacy represents yet another shift in 
diplomacy since old diplomacy and new diplomacy. The findings of this subsection and 
that of diplomatic functions illustrate that the objectives of diplomacy and tasks of a 
diplomat mostly remains unchanged, but the methods may be different due to the 
influence of technology. The following chapter will explore the practical applications of 






Chapter 4: 4IR’s Impacts in Application 
4.1 Introduction 
Considering the five central pillars of diplomacy that are implicated by 4IR, this chapter 
will explore the real-life examples of each pillar. Although 4IR is relatively new and 
adaptation continues to take place and is yet to be integrated in some fields, practical 
application has taken place in some diplomatic spaces and for diplomatic functions. 
While some countries have been more progressive and eager to integrate AI, IoT and 
other technologies, other states may be slightly more skeptical or financially incapable to 
integrate new technologies into diplomatic practice. However, due to the interconnected 
nature of diplomacy, at one point or another, states are forced to face the realities of a 
highly industrialised diplomacy and slowly begin to digitise. To illustrate the expansive 
influence of 4IR on diplomacy, this chapter explores a host of different examples, framed 
as mini-case studies. This provides a more holistic view of how far-reaching the 
implications of 4IR are and avoids making generalisations by only examining one or two 
case studies. This chapter will explore examples categorically, beginning with 
communication and later followed by interdependence, domestic and international 
frameworks, new ‘new’ diplomacy, and diplomatic functions.  Lastly, this chapter will 
explore the possibility of a new global order prompted by partnerships and innovation, as 
4IR grants new opportunities and possibilities to states.  
4.2 Communication  
Communication is a central feature of diplomacy and its forms diversify over time with 
technological innovations. Diplomatic communication between states, citizens and 
organisations has made tremendous strides. Social media allows for a large and 
multifaceted world to feel close-knit and intimate and has greatly progressed public 
diplomacy as governments have a direct line of engagement with foreign audiences. In 
addition, governments have begun to rely on sentiment analysis on social media 
platforms to have a better understanding of public opinion and make informed decisions 
based on their findings. Heads of states have also taken a liking to the use of hashtags 
to illustrate their state’s position on a particular topic.  
4.2.1 AI meets public diplomacy  
Despite the rapid diplomatic relationship between the US and Iran, public diplomacy has 
remained a central feature between the two states. The US has continuously made 
efforts to engage with the Iranian citizens through social media channels and the virtual 
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embassy. However, the Iranian government has not received the efforts of the US well, 
often resulting in internet censorship. AI, has already demonstrated to be a powerful force 
in the public diplomacy of the two states, posing negative and positive implications.  
Deep-fakes pose a rather serious threat to the image of the US as Venkataramakrishnan 
(2019), highlights the possibility of Iran utilising it as a weapon against the US. The 
Congressional Research Service Report (2019) warns that deep-fakes are becoming 
more and more realistic as AI develops, making it difficult to distinguish between what is 
real and what is fake. The report goes on to explain that deep-fakes are utilised against 
the US to demolish public trust, influence public opinion and manipulate heads of states 
and diplomats. Stanton (2019), explains the damaging effects of deep-fakes on 
international relations, claiming that it has the ability to incite violence − already 
demonstrated in US-Iran relations. 
BBC News (2020), discusses the creation and spread of a deep-fake image of President 
Trump, created by ‘Iran Cyber Security Hackers’. The image depicts the president with a 
bruised and battered face, along with a bloody mouth. In addition, the image contained 
a message by the group pledging their support for states within the Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) region. The deep-fake intends to illustrate the potential effects that 
would come as a result of Trump not stopping his targeting of Iran. The deep-fake 
demonstrates the AI capabilities of Iran, the length the state is willing to go to in protecting 
itself and lastly, the lack of concern to preserve diplomatic relations between Iran and the 
US. 
Iran has demonstrated a likeness to digital authoritarianism, censoring websites and 
content covering particular topics, as seen in 2011 when it blocked the virtual embassy 
of the US (Shahbaz, 2018). Tajdin (2019), also notes the censorship of popular social 
media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, in addition to independent 
foreign media. This is damaging on the US’s side, as the state’s public diplomacy has 
heavily relied on social media for direct engagement with Iranian citizens. Iran’s practice 
of digital authoritarianism attempts to secure a national internet, built on the internet 
services of domestic service providers. 
4.2.2 #Trumpdiplomacy  
President Trump is no stranger to social media platform, Twitter, and since his 
inauguration he has frequently reached out to heads of states on it or to voice the stance 
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on the US on a particular matter. According to Daileda (2017), the president’s most used 
hashtag during his presidential campaign and during his presidential stint is #MAGA − 
translating to ‘Make America Great Again’. Trump’s other favourite hashtags include 
#AmericaFirst; #USA; #ObamaCare; and #ICYMI, translating to ‘in case you missed it’.  
Salhani (2020), states that President Trump has executed much of the US’s foreign policy 
on Twitter, with little to no advice from his political advisors. Trump’s Twitter fingers have 
resulted in confusion surrounding US policy. Salhani believes Trump reignited the fire 
and tension between the US and Russia. Russia swooped into Northern Syria after 
Trump tweeted that US forces had evacuated the region, leading to a snowballing effect 
of chaos and tension in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Laine (2019), refers to the use of Twitter by world leaders as ‘thumb-boat diplomacy’ − a 
modern version of gunboat diplomacy6. Despite Trump’s negligent use of Twitter, the US 
Department’s fondness for and embrace of digital diplomacy and digital tools is 
spearheaded by Secretary of State, Michael Pompeo. Laine continues by citing Pompeo, 
who describes Twitter as the ‘most effective way to communicate’ US policy. Referring 
to Iran, which the US hoped to employ maximum pressure upon, Pompeo states that 
Twitter is transparent and accessible not only to Iranian citizens but to the international 
society as a whole.  
Early January 2020, following the US airstrike on Iranian Major General Qaseem 
Soleimani, the world witnessed a very public and threatening display of Laine’s (2019), 
thumb-boat diplomacy. The virtual encounter was a back and forth affair between 
President Trump and Iranian leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei tweeted ‘#SevereRevenge’ 
in response to the death of his major general and Trump was quick to respond (Romero, 
2020). The US president bravely proclaimed that new targets were identified for 
airstrikes, areas classified as official Iranian cultural sites.  
Following the prompt remarks on Twitter that inflated global hostility, two days later it was 
de-escalated on the same platform. Both, Trump and Khamenei, stated that neither 
would like the tension to result in a full-blown war (Graff, 2020). The escalation and de-
escalation of the public Iran/US feud illustrates the pros and cons of real-time 
communication. Should the communication between the two not be as instant, the effects 
 
6 Gunboat diplomacy is the execution of foreign policy geared by the threat or use of military force (Laine, 2019).  
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of the tension could have been much worse, possibly physically destructive. However, it 
may have not even have resorted to that point to start with if both leaders did not engage 
in a real-time, virtual engagement that fueled tensions.  
Simunjak and Caliandro (2019), believe that Trump’s use of social media for diplomatic 
purposes challenges the traditional characteristics of diplomatic language. This 
challenge may result in one of two possibilities: 1) Trump’s style and use of social media 
may ‘disrupt’ the traditional methods of diplomacy and upset international relations, this 
has already been witnessed in more ways than one as discussed above; and 2) Trump 
may ignite the interest and growth of a new, more conventional form of diplomacy −highly 
digitised and instant. This would break the mould of traditional diplomacy and change its 
norms, rules and behaviour. Both possibilities have been realised thus far.  
AI and ICT are both key drivers in the evolution of communication. Digital diplomatic tools 
like hashtags and social media pages have become central features of diplomatic 
communication, as highlighted by the exploration of President Trump’s Twitter 
diplomacy. By examining real-life examples through a mini-case study of Iran and US 
public diplomacy, it is highlighted that new digital technologies may promote diplomatic 
communication, but it also has the potential to hinder it. The instantaneous nature of 
advanced technologies and ICT infrastructures may prove to be a disadvantage or an 
advantage, but this is mostly circumstantial. In addition, deep-fakes and internet 
censorship may pose considerable harm to public diplomacy as it may diminish public 
trust and limit engagement.  
4.3 Interdependence 
The introduction of 4IR has caused much chaos and concern, particularly among 
developing countries. The WEF (2020), boldly states the importance of PPPs. 
Collaborations among governments, international organisations and businesses will be 
instrumental in ensuring no state gets left behind in the latest wave of technological 
innovation. This section will explore partnerships which have emerged, all of which are 
centred solely on 4IR, or other technological innovations.  
4.3.1 The case of India  
India, a developing nation, has showcased promise in the era of 4IR. Kedia (2018), 
highlights that, in 2015, the country was ranked 11th in terms of global manufacturing 
competitiveness, out of 40 countries. In addition, it was anticipated that India would 
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continue to climb the rankings in years to come. What provides India an advantage 
includes its large and young workforce, low labour costs and a vast skills base that 
include engineers, researchers and scientists. However, considering that the majority of 
its workforce is low-skilled, the government and private sector need to work extremely 
hard in ensuring it can reap the benefits of the latest industrial revolution. 
According to Verma and Sharma (2018), India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has 
encouraged all of India’s ministries to welcome AI and familiarise themselves with it. In 
doing so, ministries can establish how AI may be utilised to address the wide-ranging 
socio-economic issues of the country. In a 2018 radio address, Prime Minister Modi 
(2018) highlighted the possibilities of AI, stating that it may reduce poverty and corruption 
through increased transparency. In addition, Modi states that drones may be used to 
increase crop production and in turn the livelihood of farmers and, furthermore, may 
enhance security in remote regions.  
Despite India’s traditional, albeit successful, manufacturing system, the WEF has 
recognised the country’s promise, so much so, that it was prompted to set up a Centre 
for the 4IR in the country. Ariffen (2018), highlights some of India’s innovative initiatives 
that may have caught the attention of the WEF. These include a national database with 
the biometrics of 1.2 billion residents; being ranked first in ICT service exports in 2017; a 
robust start-up scene; and the announcement of the National Programme on AI.  
Herh (2018), details the joint cooperation agreement signed by South Korea and India 
that aims to enhance cooperation among the states for the advancement of 4IR. The 
Korea-India Future Strategy Group enables collaboration between India and the Korean 
Institute of Advanced Technology for the highly industrialised manufacturing of robotics, 
smart factories and other developments in addition to partnerships for research and 
design projects. 
In 2019, India and the US engaged in a 2+2 dialogue7. The US Department of State 
(DoS) (2019), reports that the dialogue was led by Mark Esper (US Secretary of 
Defence); Michael Pompeo (US Secretary of State); Rajnath Singh (India’s Minister of 
Defence); and Dr Jaishankar (India’s Minister of External Affairs). Chaudhury (2019), 
details the key outcomes of the engagement, one of which being a new science and 
 
7 2+2 dialogue is a mechanism for diplomatic engagement between two countries. Two ministers from each 
country meet to discuss the security interests and strategic objectives of their respective states (Rana, 2018). 
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technology agreement. It outlines cooperation efforts between the US and India in the 
fields of technology, science and innovation. The US continues to be a primary and 
imperative partner to India for the development of science and technology and the 
agreement provides a framework for continued collaboration and success.  
Brende (2018), claims that not only does India have the potential to play a vital role in 
4IR but it may also have the ability to shape the revolution. In addition to its large and 
youthful workforce, the country also possesses the second greatest number of internet 
users worldwide. The Indian government has made its aspirations clear and has initiated 
key relations with public and private stakeholders, governments and international 
organisations to steer its country in the appropriate direction.  
4.3.2 The case of China  
China has clearly illustrated its efforts to assist developing countries, more specifically 
African countries (Wu, 2019). However, Ferchen (2020) explores China’s international 
developmental assistance and how it differs from the traditional modes of Western 
assistance, such as aid. China presents developmental assistance to developing 
countries as mutually beneficial for both parties, but such countries have questioned if 
these partnerships are indeed beneficial and if they coincide with their country’s own 
developmental trajectory. Brazil has expressed concern over ‘commodity dependency’8. 
Myanmar also attempted to redirect its diplomatic relations and has since come to rely 
on the US as its main commercial partner. Sri Lanka worries about the ‘Chinese loans-
for-infrastructure’ that may see Sri Lanka over-burdened with debt, further leading to 
unsustainable economic growth. Such realisations and concerns by developing countries 
illustrate that countries are looking beyond their immediate needs and economic 
circumstances and are instead in search of sustainable development.  
Funwie (2019:6), explores the cases of China and South Korea in the era of 4IR and in 
relation to international relations. The author describes both states as ‘late-starters’, in 
comparison to other highly-industrialised states such as Japan and the US. China and 
South Korea both possess roughly a decade’s worth of knowledge and experience 
regarding 4IR technologies, allowing the states to make immense expeditious progress 
in this time.  
 
8 A country may be considered commodity dependent when 60% or more of their total exported goods are raw 
materials, rather than finished products and services (UNCTAD, 2019).  
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China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also referred to as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
initiative, was established in 2013 with the aim to connect Asia, Africa and Europe 
through six land and sea corridors (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
[EBRD], nd). It is an attempt by China to enhance regional integration and trade and 
further stimulate economic growth within the respective regions. EBRD (nd) highlights 
the five priority areas of the BRI which are: connecting individuals from the respective 
regions; financial integration; policy coordination; unrestricted trade; and infrastructure 
connectivity. Yang (2017), highlights the opportunities presented by BRI where 
developing countries may ‘leapfrog’ stages of industrialisation that they may have 
missed.  
In 2017, President Xi JingPing announced the digitisation of the BRI as he attempts to 
steer China into the complete transition towards a digital economy. Wenyan (2018), 
details the statement made by the Chinese president at the BRI Forum for International 
Cooperation, where he stated that countries should pursue innovation-driven 
development and intensify cooperation in frontier areas such as digital economy, artificial 
intelligence, nanotechnology and quantum computing, and advance the development of 
big data, cloud computing and smart cities so as to turn them into a digital silk road of 
the 21st century. The rise of 4IR may present the perfect opportunity to kickstart BRI 
since the initial momentum of the initiative has died down.  
Wenyan (2018), provides detailed ways in which a digitised silk road may promote 
sustainable development, green transformation and e-commerce:  
Table 3: The possibilities of the Digital Silk Road for Developing countries  
 Utilisation  Example 
1. The Digital Silk Road has the potential to 
improve the viability, efficiency and 
sustainability of infrastructure 
development which is essential for 
developing countries who lack in 
infrastructure.  
The utilisation of monitoring systems 
and smart sensors may ensure 
optimal use of resources.  
2.  Advanced ICT infrastructure to BRI 
partner countries allowing for the 
Mobile internet in rural villages may 
create jobs, transforming traditional 
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upgrade and transformation of 
traditional businesses. This may be 
especially significant in rural areas as it 
has the potential to induce job creation 
and economic growth.  
farmers to online vendors. 
Furthermore, more routes may be 
designed connecting rural and urban 
areas offering further business 
potential.  
2.  As small businesses connect to digital 
networks for trading in international 
markets, it may be supported by ‘smart 
cross-border logistics systems.’ 
11 November is commonly known as 
‘Singles Day’ where Chinese e-
commerce businesses traditionally 
host 24-hours of online shopping 
sales. It consists of buyers and 
sellers from over 200 countries. Such 
a significant quantity of orders for 
global distribution may pose logistical 
challenges. However, with AI and 
Geographical Information Systems9 
(GIS), the quickest and most cost-
effective routes may be determined 
for delivery.  
3.  Sustainable development through big 
data allows for the direct solving of 
environmental issues. 
Big data is used in African countries 
to improve the responses to water 
insecurity, natural disasters and 
climate change. This can significantly 
improve food production and farming.  
4.  Provide basic internet to over 3 billion 
citizens. An inaccessibility to internet 
connection may widen the divide 
between the developed and developing.  
Small businesses can be digitised, 
opening up their target market and 
further generating growth and job 
creation.  
 (Wenyan, 2018) 
 
9 GIS is cemented in the geographical sciences. It is a system that designs maps that ‘communicates, perform 
analysis, share information, and solves complex problems’ (Esri, nd). In addition, GIS provides more in-depth 
analysis of large datasets that may allow for more informed decision-making processes.  
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Nan (2019), highlights key notes made by JinPing at the 2019 G20 summit. He 
emphasised multilateralism in the era of 4IR, stating that there should be a transition from 
a ‘blockade to openness’ and that states should move from operating in isolation to 
forging integration with  one another. JinPing distinctively draws attention to development 
opportunities that are now arising as a result of 4IR and encourages states to take on 
those opportunities, as a result of international collaboration and cooperation. 
4.3.3 The case of South Africa   
South Africa, a young democracy with a fragmented economy, has stated its desires to 
harness the full potential of 4IR. At the annual State of the Nation Address (SONA), 
President Cyril Ramaphosa (2019), discussed the formation of the ‘Presidential 
Committee on the 4th Industrial Revolution’. The committee is made up of various 
stakeholders and experts from different industries. These individuals are tasked with 
establishing how to speedily integrate technological innovations into South African 
industries, sectors and the economy, in an effort to achieve ‘inclusive growth and social 
development’. President Ramaphosa has stated that digital transformation is imperative 
for South Africa as it may make the country an international competitor.  
 At President Rampahosa’s second SONA (2019), he highlighted his desire to create a 
smart, highly digitised city. However, this was not the first effort to have an industrialised 
and digitised smart hub in South Africa. In 2014, Zendai Developments, a Chinese 
development company, expressed their intention to create and build a smart city in 
Johannesburg East. Construction on the US$8 billion city started at the beginning of 
2015, but roughly a year later the development group decided to abandon the project, 
due to South Africa’s ‘poor economic conditions’ (Business Tech, 2019).  
Despite this, Ramphosa’s efforts appear to be on track. At the 2020 SONA, the President 
highlighted that the government, together with financial institutions, had established ‘an 
innovative process’ for the funding of digital, water, sewerage and electrical 
infrastructure. This, along with the roads, are the foundation of the new smart hub in 
Lanseria, Gauteng (Head, 2020). In 2020, the Presidential Commission also 
recommended numerous priority areas, such as the creation of an AI institute, building 
4IR infrastructure, amending or creating 4IR-centered policy and legislation, and 
investing in human capital development. However, Dwolatzky and Harris (2021), critique 
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the governments abilities to execute such recommendations, citing a ‘gap’ in the 
Commission’s vision and the reality of what is happening on the ground. 
Maisiri and van Dyk (2019) explore the readiness of South Africa for 4IR. Their study is 
based on six key factors, some of which include: skills availability, data-driven services, 
infrastructure, and organisational strategy. They conclude that in the realm of digital 
transformation, the country is ‘partially emerging’ and ‘partially developing’. The authors 
highlight that South Africa is lacking in infrastructure and strategy that supports 4IR and 
thus requires greater international collaboration to advance science and technology 
within the country. 4IR and its technologies ought to be appropriately integrated into all 
sectors to kickstart inclusive economic growth and make South Africa a viable competitor 
in the era of 4IR.  
South Africa has noted the value of science diplomacy. Masters (2016:177), describes 
the state’s efforts in this regard as a two-track approach where track one refers to South 
Africa as a ‘producer’ or ‘exporter’ of knowledge and track two considers the country as 
a ‘consumer’ or ‘importer’ of knowledge. South Africa has prioritised international 
cooperation in the areas of science and technology, forming bilateral relations with 
countries such as the United Kingdome (UK), Sweden and Norway, to name a few.  
South Africa’s Department of Science and Technology has also formed partnerships with 
non-state actors such as the National Research Fund (NRF) and the Council of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR).  
In Africa, South Africa plays a key role in producing and exporting scientific knowledge 
in an attempt to promote African development (Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation, 2015). However, Masters (2016), evaluates if the country may consistently 
uphold its role as a knowledge producer and exporter, citing the concerns of Wild (2015), 
who claims that there is a lack of coordination among the South African government, 
academia and industries. This concern may be more pressing in current times than ever 
given the rapid speed at which technologies are developing in the era of 4IR. South Africa 
needs to develop a more comprehensive approach at absorbing and producing 
knowledge to uphold its title as a knowledge producer. It is possible that the Presidential 




As a knowledge ‘consumer’, South Africa attempts to position itself as a viable and 
sustainable destination for collaborative partnerships in the advancement of science and 
technology (Masters, 2016). If positioned favourably, countries or organisations may 
deem South Africa as an appropriate destination to invest scientific and financial 
resources into. It will be critical for South Africa to become equipped with the latest 
technologies that may advance practices in public and private life. In addition, it may fast-
track the country’s development and later transform the country’s abilities as a 
knowledge producer and exporter, creating favourable opportunities for diplomatic 
relations on the grounds of science.  
Skills acquisition is imperative for the South African labour force and can be done through 
international exchange programmes. In 2017, South Africa and China’s respective 
ministries on science and technology established the ‘Young Scientists Exchange 
Programme’, with the goal of providing young researchers the opportunity to acquire 
skills and exchange knowledge (SA Government, 2019a). The first exchange occurred 
in April 2019, with seven students from various scientific fields placed at different 
research institutions in the other country. Ultimately, students are encouraged to publish 
academic papers, advance research, and develop new products and patents.  Such 
programmes are imperative for creating young leaders in South Africa within the scientific 
fields that can assist the country in making breakthroughs, integrating science and 
technology into varying sectors, and making the country a true frontrunner for 4IR in 
Africa.  
The EU and South Africa’s Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) have a long-
standing partnership which saw the department touring Europe in September 2019 to 
equip itself and the relevant entities with the knowledge of how best to respond to 4IR. 
In addition, the EU aims to assist South Africa in seeking out opportunities and forming 
key partnerships in the areas of the public and private sectors, business, and research 
funding (SA Government, 2019b). 
While South Africa, and Africa at large, have shown promise with numerous tech hubs 
and budding start-ups, Oguamanam (2019), states that these attempts have mostly been 
uncoordinated, with a higher than average failure rate. Therefore, partnerships are key. 
Partnerships should occur among public and private sectors, North-South relations, 
South-South relations, and regional and international organisations.  
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Burger (2021), outlines the newly developed partnership between CSIR and Columbia’s 
Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution under the WEF network. The partnership aims 
to enhance research capabilities and unlock the maximum potential of AI and IoT. It 
further calls for technical training to develop new skills and the required infrastructure for 
digital transformation to occur. The partnership aims to make considerable efforts in 
creating a framework on new and advanced technologies that may foster new digital 
opportunities. Importantly, the collaborative efforts aim to support strategies amongst 
public and private partners that may lead to technological developments that meets 
industry needs.  
President Ramaphosa has emphasised the need to prioritise skills development in 
schools that will contribute to the country’s vision of an e-skilled based economy driven 
by technology, as per the National Development Plan. To support this vision, the 
government has begun prioritising coding and robotics into the schooling curriculum 
(Business Tech, 2021). President Rampahosa has highlighted that a draft curriculum on 
robotics and coding has been submitted to Umalusi to undergo evaluation and quality 
assurance and it is expected to be rolled out in 202t, at 200 schools for Grades R to 3 
and 1000 schools for Grade 7.  
Nagtegaal (2021), details South Africa’s plans to modernise the country’s National 
Identity System. The government plans to create a highly digitised and secure identity 
system that will act as a single source of information for all citizens. The system will 
include citizens and non-citizens that are within the territorial borders of South Africa. In 
addition, the system should be affordable and accessible to all, specifically those residing 
in remote locations. More importantly, it should be robust, secure and protect user-
privacy. However, the budget of the National Department of Home Affairs may act as a 
hinderance to achieving a newly transformed and digitised system. However, Nagtegaal 
(2020), states that it is possible and the government should look to Estonia for inspiration 
as the country leads in digital governance.   
From examining mini-case studies of India, China and South Africa, it may be established 
that international cooperation and collaboration with state and non-state actors is 
imperative for states to harness the full potential of 4IR. Despite financial resources being 
an asset in the era of 4IR, equally important is the knowledge and skills that a state 
possesses. States that lack either are inclined to seek partnerships that are mutually 
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beneficial, ensuring their development and preventing them from being left behind in 
terms of scientific and technological advances.  
4.4 Domestic and international legal frameworks  
Feijioo et al., (2020), explore the regulatory steps that have been taken by states to deal 
with the integration of AI. In 2017, the US set up an advisory committee, titled the Future 
of Artificial Intelligence Act, to explore the possible implications of AI on various activities 
of day to day life. China has launched several ethics-related standards. China’s steps 
have mostly been geared towards robotics and driverless vehicles. Although government 
bodies have offered the relevant support, most of the initiatives are instrumented and led 
by industries. In the UK, it was strongly called for that consumers are aware when AI is 
utilised to make sensitive or important decisions. While these strides speak to the use of 
AI in daily activity and industry, it fails to exclusively regulate the relationship between AI 
and diplomacy or international relations at large.  
Canada has also realised the promise of AI and in collaboration with the Canadian 
Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), developed a national AI strategy entitled the 
Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy. According to CIFAR (2020), the strategy 
was the first of its kind in the world and prioritises four central objectives:  
➢ Build and support an AI-focused research community on a national level; 
➢ Create a global footprint for Canada that leads in AI-focused discussions in policy, 
economic, ethical and legal implications in the advancement of AI; 
➢ To substantially increase the number of AI researchers and graduates within 
Canada; and  
➢ To create and maintain collaborative efforts among the three major Canadian 
hubs for scientific excellence − Toronto, Edmonton and Montreal.  
The upper house of the UK Parliament, the House of Lords (2018), notes that as per 
advisement from the Law Society of England and Wales, AI should not yet be legislated 
as it remains in its infancy and its full effects and capabilities are yet to be realised. Once 
complete development of AI takes place, then it can be appropriately legislated. If AI is 
legislated before it is fully developed, legislation may need to be regularly updated to 
meet new requirements. 
According to Kula (2019), Japan has also taken steps to ensure the protection of personal 
information. The country amended the Act on the Protection of Personal Information 
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(APPI). Given the digitisation of many industries, civilians often share their personal data 
online and this poses risks in the event of being hacked and their information being stolen 
online, this has forced states to take greater protectionist measures.  
Given the consequences posed by deep-fakes, states have begun acting against it. Ruiz 
(2020), explores the proposals and laws by the US to protect itself and individual states 
against deep-fakes. In a 12-month period, 12 federal and state bills were passed. In 
Texas, the law attempts to deter election interference which often occurs through deep-
fakes in video form. Ruiz (2020), further highlights that at the time of writing, numerous 
bills were set before the US Congress and waited to be passed, such as the ‘Deep-fakes 
Accountability Act’ and ‘Identifying Outputs of General Adversarial Act (IOGAN)’. Due to 
the complexity of deep-fakes, how realistic it is becoming and the rapid pace at which 
technologies are developing to design it, both scientists and policymakers should work 
at developing policies to protect the state and citizens against it.  
Chipman et al., (2019), provide the key aspects of the IOGAN Act, stating that the Act 
requires detailed and timely reports regarding deep-fakes by foreign threats. In addition, 
the Act also covers the identification of deep-fakes that may be harmful to US elections 
as it spreads false information. Lastly, the Act attempts to encourage competition among 
researchers for the detection of deep-fakes.  
Policymakers may encounter difficulties when attempting to legislate AI, or any other 
advanced technology, but that is to be expected due to the continuous and rapid 
development of new technologies. According to Turekian et al., (2018), this rapid 
development of technologies will result in security challenges on a national and 
international level and therefore it requires a multilateral approach. As the nature of 
technology is not geographically bound and its abilities transcend borders, states may 
realise that to protect themself and ensure the highest level of cybersecurity, legislation 
will have to be done on a bilateral or multilateral level.  
Gill (2019:176), highlights the 2018 meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) on ‘emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems 
(LAWS)’ to establish a framework that attempts to ensure national security in the 
application of AI. Comprising of 125 states, 10 principles were identified in the areas of 
accountability, international humanitarian law, risk assessment and mitigation, human 
responsibility and human-machine interaction.  In addition, other outcomes of the GGE 
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meetings include the group acknowledging the potential implications of civilian casualties 
and therefore explored what possible measures can be taken to prevent the loss of 
human life. GGE also promotes the responsible but innovative design of emerging 
technologies and encourages the responsible use of LAWS in accordance to 
international law (Geneva Internet Platform Digital Watch, 2020).  
The European Commission has acted swiftly to design an ethical framework on the use 
of AI. The High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on AI drafted a framework that prioritises 
three aspects of trustworthy AI, stating that it should be lawful, ethical and robust. 
According to the European Commission (2020), the HLEG focuses on seven 
requirements in the ethical guidelines that AI should meet to be considered as 
trustworthy. These requirements include, but are not limited to, ensuring that AI models, 
data and systems are transparent; adherence to data governance and privacy; and AI 
models should promote diversity and fairness by being accessible to all and avoiding 
possible unfair bias.  
The Public Voice is an organisation concerned about technological developments, 
specifically those pertaining to the internet. The organisation has drafted a universal 
guideline for the design and use of AI. The Public Voice (2018), highlights that AI systems 
should ensure human safety and take precautionary measures in this regard; institutions 
should secure themselves against cybersecurity threats; should an AI system reach a 
stage that it operates in the absence of human control, it should be terminated; and the 
institution that designs an AI system should be made known to the public.  
Feijoo et al., (2020), acknowledge the efforts of various and independent stakeholders, 
organisations, businesses and governments but believes that aside from independent 
efforts by actors, there is a dire need for an international collaborative effort for the use 
and legislation of AI. Many states have established frameworks regarding AI as a whole, 
aspects of AI like deep-fakes and LAWS, and privacy protection. In addition to the 
frameworks designed by states, some regional and international organisations have also 
proposed ethical guidelines for the use of AI. Despite the steps taken by the respective 
states and organisations, there is yet to be a common framework that guides a digitised 
diplomatic interaction between states such as the VCDR of 1961.  
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4.5 New ‘new’ diplomacy 
As aforementioned, old diplomacy was old and secretive. New diplomacy was more open 
but now, we see yet a newer and more open phase of diplomacy as diplomats and 
citizens have a direct line of engagement on social media and diplomats from respective 
states openly engage with one another on various online platforms. This section will 
explore recent examples of this new ‘new’ diplomacy of open interaction. In addition, it 
will further examine the use of sentiment analysis by governments and organisations to 
understand the response of citizens on social media to assist foreign policymakers and 
enforcers in making more informed decisions.  
4.5.1 Horizontal engagements  
Dumčiuvienė (2016), examines the practice of ‘Twiplomacy’ by Lithuania with the state’s 
foreign policy being very specific in its foreign policy focus. The state utilises Twitter to 
support and execute the foreign policy goals of the state and further build and uphold the 
public image of Lithuania. Lithuanian foreign minister, Linus Linkevičiu, is extremely 
active on Twitter, sharing the state’s foreign policy objectives and important upcoming 
events pertaining to international relations. Lithuania also comprises of Twitter accounts 
specific to diplomatic missions and individual diplomats to provide a more specific line of 
information and communication.  
China has also embraced Twitter, mostly to communicate with foreign audiences as the 
use of the application remains banned within the state. The Bangkok Post (2020), 
describes the use of Twitter by Chinese officials as ‘confrontational’ and ‘informal’. In 
2019, a virtual dispute between Chinese minister, Zhao Linjin, and former US 
ambassador, Susan Rice took place. Linjin made allegations regarding racial 
discrimination experienced in Washington and Rice responded by referring to the 
Chinese official as a ‘racist disgrace’.  
Yuan Zeng, a media expert and lecturer, tells Bangkok Post (2020), that four factors have 
pushed China to join and utilise Twitter: 
➢ Negative foreign media surrounding the mass detention of Muslims in Xinjiang, 
China; 




➢ The on-going trade dispute between China and the US which has served as an 
additional source of negative media; and 
➢ ‘The Trump effect’.  
China’s attempt to use the social media application to improve its public image has mostly 
been unsuccessful. In February 2020, leader Xi JinPing called a meeting with Chinese 
government officials and much of the meeting focused on the government utilising Twitter 
to illustrate a united China with a fighting spirit in the wake of the global pandemic, Covid-
19 (The Economist, 2020). However, the execution did not go as planned after one 
Chinese official Zha Liyou’s tweets became offensive in response to criticism surrounding 
how China has dealt with the virus, stating: ‘You speak in such a way that you look like 
part of the virus and you will be eradicated just like virus. Shame on you.’ 
4.5.2 Sentiment analysis  
With sentiment analysis, the US may improve its understanding of the opinions of foreign 
audiences. To learn about and understand Iranian sentiment towards the US,  was a 
costly and tedious process as Elson and Nader (2011), conducted a study involving 
telephonic interviews with 1 002 Iranian citizens. It took roughly 18 days to interview all 
1 002 citizens and all interviewers were external to the study, undergoing rigorous 
training beforehand. The study yielded some fruitful results but consisted of multiple 
limitations, excluding members of society that do not possess a home telephone line and 
many who were unwilling to participate. In addition, some interviews were abruptly cut 
short due to events that may have taken place at the time which cut telephone lines. 
Sentiment analysis is a more cost-efficient and effective alternative to understand the 
opinion of foreign audiences.  
The government of the UK has begun using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to more 
concisely understand public opinion. Similar to that of sentiment analysis, LDA creates 
structured latent patterns from a sea of unstructured data (Gracie et al., 2019). Killbride 
(2020), states that utilising a sentiment analysis application, the UK-based organisation 
Aylien, was able to analyse and understand public opinion regarding ‘Brexit’.  The study 
sought news articles that featured Brexit anywhere in the body of the source, it separated 
negative from positive articles and then illustrated the findings numerically on a graph. In 
addition, the study explored media within the UK as well as foreign media groups by 
countries to further understand foreign perceptions of Brexit.  
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Gracie et al., (2019), investigated sentiment analysis in the US Department of Defense 
(DoD). A special unit of DoD, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), gathers large inputs of data and interprets it to ‘assess potential threats and 
inform mission planning’. Information is pulled from various social media platforms, 
comments on official government websites or pages, and field agent reports. To ease 
the process, the unit created a program titled Deep Exploration and Filtering of Text 
(DEFT). Geared by NLP, automatic extraction of the relevant data occurs, the data can 
aid analysts in gaining insightful information and enable them to take the appropriate 
action from there. 
Over time, technology has allowed diplomacy to become more open and inclusive 
through social media platforms. However, algorithmic processes like sentiment analysis 
takes understanding engagements to new levels as states become more informed about 
public opinion. Social media has allowed for a direct line of engagement between citizens 
at home and abroad and further taken public diplomacy to new heights as states directly 
engage with foreign audiences, as witnessed with Chinese officials. In addition to 
understanding public opinion through sentiment analysis, strides made in AI like DEFT 
and NLP, allow states to quickly gather and interpret information, allowing decision-
making processes to occur in a timely manner.  
4.6 Diplomatic functions  
Satariano (2019), explores the work of the world’s ‘first foreign ambassador to the 
technology industry’, Casper Klynge of Denmark, who describes emerging technologies 
as a daunting factor as it threatens national institutions, human rights and democracy. 
Appointed in 2017, Klynge was tasked with approaching Silicon Valley to represent his 
nation’s interests to technologically-centred corporations like Facebook and Google. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs for Denmark, Jeppe Kofdad, explains the importance of 
governments setting the boundaries for technologies and not vice versa. While 
technology may be consuming and dictate decision-making procedures, government 
officials ought to remain in control of such decisions and ultimately, create a guideline for 
its use.  
The US DoS (2017) details the tasks of the first official ‘Cyber-diplomat’ of the US, 
Christopher Painter. Painter’s tasks include acting in collaboration with private and public 
sectors on cyber concerns and issues, the coordination of US departments’ diplomatic 
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engagement on cyber-related issues and advising the necessary state departments and 
secretaries on cyber engagements and issues. It is evident that the role of a cyber 
diplomat is not much different from the traditional tasks of a diplomat but to serve 
exclusively to cyberspace and cyber issues.  
According to Maack (2019), after Estonia experienced a cyberattack in 2007, referred to 
as the world’s first cyberwar, the country was urged to focus on cybersecurity. In 2018, 
Estonia appointed Heli Tiirma-Klaar, boasting the title ‘Ambassador at Large for Cyber 
Security’, the ambassador insists that there is a dire need for specialised diplomats that 
may serve as  translators and seek out the appropriate means and routes to improve the 
cybersecurity of their state. Tiirma-Klaar states that the daily activities performed by a 
diplomat today may be considered a deviation from traditional diplomatic practice and 
tasks. In addition, where diplomats were mostly responsible for communicating with other 
diplomats from the respective states, they find themselves also communicating with 
different stakeholders for the state to stay abreast of technological developments.  
As 4IR continues to disrupt virtually all subsets of international relations, states have 
illustrated their commitment to a highly digitised diplomacy. Denmark, the US and 
Estonia have appointed diplomats and ambassadors to secure their state’s national 
interest on a technological front and improve and secure cybersecurity. The interactions 
of cyber diplomats and ambassadors are not limited to states but extend to non-state 
organisations such as tech-hubs in Silicon Valley. In addition, apart from being equipped 
with the diplomatic skills to secure their nation’s interest, the cyber diplomats should also 
possess the necessary technological and scientific knowledge to best achieve the foreign 
policy goals set out by the state.  
4.7 A new global order  
Barrinha and Renard (2020), state that central to the very definition of power is the cyber 
dimension, which is becoming just as significant as security and economic factors. In 
addition, the cyber capabilities of a state may allow it to make up for the areas in which 
it lacks such as financial or skilled resources. Segal (2016) claims that to be termed as a 
‘great cyber power’, there are four elements to possess: a predatory military driven by 
cyber advances and intelligences, an attractive cyberspace story, public institutions that 
utilise and channel the findings and energy of the private sector, and technologically-
driven economies.  
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According to Kedia (2018), developed countries have the upper hand, possessing 
monetary and skills-based resources but argues that hope is not lost for developing 
nations. Kedia explains that countries, such as India, have the opportunity to leap-frog 
stages of development and industrialisation. This can be done in two ways: first, by 
identifying their comparative advantage and second, by preparing for a highly digitised 
and industrialised future.  
Leurent and Aurik (2018), also highlight that not all countries may embrace 4IR 
technologies and choose to stick with traditional modes of production. They, however, 
also advise that states explore their possibilities and find their competitive advantage in 
new, highly industrialised industries. The authors also suggest that it is indeed time for 
collaboration, not just among public and private sectors but also among governments, 
an act that may be key in addressing international concerns.  
Nan (2019), explains the key factors mentioned during the annual WEF meeting in 
Davos, where Klaus Schwab emphasised that 4IR will ‘shape international cooperation’. 
No country has the ability to operate independently and new technologies may introduce 
new challenges. Four main elements are likely to arise as a result of 4IR: enhanced 
economic relations among states, greater trade and investment, increased integration 
due to mutual interests, and interaction between industrial chains.  
It has been traditionally believed that technological capabilities and financial resources 
have been barriers to states developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, as highlighted by 
van der Meer (2016). However, that belief was proved to be redundant in 2006 when 
North Korea, a state that has been known to be less developed, acquired nuclear 
weapons. 
Barkin (2017), discusses the concerns of Federica Mogherini at the time of writing. 
Mogherini, the EU’s chief of foreign policy, warns of diplomatic relations becoming more 
transactional and less emotional as diplomacy is increasingly affected by globalised 
trends. Globalisation and increasingly advanced trends in AI, big data and IoT have 
resulted in a complex and more interconnected international environment (Afshan, 2019).  
Previously, bilateral and multilateral engagements were prompted by aligning values and 
the promotion of such values in the global arena, but states are now concerned, more 
than ever, with their own national interests and national security in a new, borderless 
world (Afshan, 2019). According to Anderson (2014), when dealing with ICT 
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infrastructure, it is imperative for states to cooperate despite the existing geopolitical 
tensions. ICT infrastructure may play a significant role in regional security and may limit 
the possibility of terrorism.  
Gill (2019), explores the geopolitical impact of AI on international security and notes that 
states who have already begun investing in new technologies for an automated military 
force and digitised security systems may be the frontrunners of international security. 
While China and the US have been illustrated to be the most competitive in terms of 
reaping economic and material benefits for national security as a result of AI integration, 
this era of AI advancements may provide opportunities for states like Japan and Canada. 
Japan, Canada and others that are financially capable may develop new techniques to 
use AI in a ‘less-data-hungry’ manner (Gill, 2019:171). Such developments may result in 
a more equal balance of power in international security and in the global society at large, 
transitioning to a multipolar system.  
According to Brondoni and Zaninotto (2018), the latest globalisation trends, spurred by 
4IR, have prompted the emergence and growth of developing countries. Countries such 
as India, Taiwan and South Korea are beginning to become more active in international 
markets and more competitive with bigger, traditional players like the US. The new 
dynamics of the global arena may change the traditional global order as we know it where 
the US and China have taken centre stage and many developing countries have 
remained on the periphery. States now have the opportunity to play a bigger part in 
international markets while simultaneously improving their global status.  
4.7.1 The threat of cyber warfare on diplomacy  
Military weapons and the threat of force has become an increasingly popular tactic 
among governments to achieve their states’ national interests, as highlighted at the 2019 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit. President Trump stated that the US 
military is at its most powerful and the state would utilise it, if necessary (Gamel, 2019). 
These threats are not new, but it is possible that physical and diplomatic implications are 
becoming more alarming as more states have access to advanced technologies and 
weapons. George (1996), was quick to ask a valid question: when is the use of force 
acceptable as a deterrence measure or in times of crises? George continues by quoting 
President George Bush (1993), who states that ‘every case is unique’. While at the time, 
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President Bush felt that there was no single set of rules that could establish whether or 
not force should be utilised. Unfortunately, this can no longer be the case. 
Bell (2017), optimistically toys with the idea that if more states possess nuclear weapons, 
it may result in a more peaceful international society. The primary goal of states is 
security and if a state feels secure due to their nuclear possessions, states may be less 
likely to threaten other states or be threatened. However, this is an unlikely scenario. Gill 
(2019), highlights that the threat of AI on international security is much greater than it is 
imaginable. As states weaponise AI and prior to a state dislodging it for attack, 
international security is immediately threatened. The ever-changing and continuously 
developing nature of AI is a major contributing factor to insecurity.  
Galliot (2015), claims that integrating autonomous weapons into military systems may 
reduce the length of war against human forces, resulting in the stabilisation of peace in 
an anarchic territory. Wars, or armed conflicts, between human forces such as anti-
governmental groups or rebel forces may last for decades and result in the loss of human 
lives, infrastructure and stability in the region. Countries, or international organisations 
like the UN, often spend billions to deploy human peacekeepers to occupy a region for 
lengthy periods at a time where conflict is prone to occur such as the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers in Liberia from 2003 until 2018 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2019). 
Armstrong (2010), has described the deployment of peacekeepers by the UN as a form 
of public diplomacy. 
Arayoe (2018:14), highlights that advances in war technology, particularly among 
wealthier Western states, have resulted in an increased chance of the human race facing 
extreme destruction. Previously, fewer states had access to nuclear weapons and 
advanced technologies, but Sawers (2017), highlights that, at the time of writing, nine 
states possessed nuclear weapons. World Population Review (2020) confirms those 
states as: 
Table 4: States’ possession of nuclear weapons 















US 6185 ✔   
UK 215 ✔   
Pakistan 145  ✔  
Israel 80 ✔   
North Korea 15   ✔ 
China 280 ✔   
France  300 ✔   
India 135 ✔   
Russia  6850  ✔  
Adapted from Sawers (2017) and World Population Review (2020) 
4.7.1.1 Cyberattacks and threat 
Digitised threats and attacks on governments have become increasingly frequent. 
Governments have committed entire committees to deal with such threats. Although a 
significant number of these threats may be from private interest groups or terrorist 
associations, it may also be from other governments. In addition to the exploration of 
cyber threats and attacks, this section will also explore the hostility between governments 
and the back and forth threats that are made by the respective states. 
4.7.1.1.1 North Korea and the US 
In recent years, the international society has been a hostile environment as bilateral 
relations between the US and North Korea continue to become increasingly tense. 
Arayoe (2018,) credits nuclear weapons developments as the primary factor for the 
strained relationship  between the two states.  
North Korea has always illustrated strong desires to develop their nuclear capabilities 
and new AI advances just might grant the state the perfect opportunity to do so. Barno 
and Bensahel (2018), explain that the latest technological advancements for weapons 
and military capabilities as a result of 4IR, may place ‘rising power’ states at an 
advantage and even more so for authoritarian states that do not abide by regulatory 
norms such as civilian oversight and transparency− such as North Korea. The US mostly 
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relies on ‘over-invested legacy systems’, as determined by Barno and Bensahel (2018), 
which implies that the state has to incur the costs of traditional systems and new systems, 
whereas other states without a century-old system may fully invest in new highly 
technologically advanced systems driven by AI.  
Military and Aerospace Electronics (2018,) reported that the US has been secretly 
investing in research to design an AI system enabling its military to anticipate and track 
missiles launched from  North Korea in particular but also other states which may pose 
a threat. The Pentagon stated that the research was highly classified and if it had 
successful outcomes, the AI system would have the ability to think independently, sort 
through large amounts of data, and its speed and accuracy will be far beyond  that of 
human resources. Such detection systems may result in significantly reducing the impact 
of air-strikes.  
Kang (2018), explores North Korea’s efforts in research and design aligned to AI, robotics 
and other advanced technologies which Kim Jong Un has expressed can be used for 
economic and military purposes. While it is widely believed that North Korea hopes such 
advances may allow  the country to  keep a more watchful eye on South Korea, the state 
may also be attempting to position itself as a powerful force in geopolitics. 
North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was not received well by the US. The New 
Statesman (2017), recalls President Trump’s promise to raise ‘fire and fury like the world 
has never seen before’ in response to the country’s new acquisitions. However, North 
Korea responded claiming to be in possession of a small, but lethal and advanced, 
nuclear warhead that could reach US soil. According to Shim Jae Hoon (2017), the 
possession and threats of North Korea pushed the US closer into the embrace of South 
Korea. A few weeks after the first test launch of the intercontinental missile towards 
California, North Korea launched yet another one but this time it landed even closer to 
the US. These advances in such a short time illustrate North Korea’s dedication to its 
nuclear ambitions, in addition to its possession of advanced technologies.  
Kim (2020), highlights the two priority goals set out by Kim Jong Un since his term as 
North Korean leader began: 1) nuclear development; and 2) economic development. The 
goal of nuclear development was primarily to deal with threats from the West and improve 
the country’s international power status. Mansoor and Hussein (2017:15), explain that 
the rapid development in nuclear technology may be as a result of foreign assistance, 
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‘reversed engineering of Russian technology’, and the state’s own technical knowledge 
and skillset. In 2018, North Korea changed its position in the international arena, going 
from a state in isolation to one that is willing to partake in diplomatic engagement. Laipson 
(2017), explains that countries who spend long periods in isolation may possess major 
insecurities causing them to seem as if they are poised and confident, but in reality, the 
state is concerned with showcasing its vulnerabilities to global superpowers and within 
the global arena.  
According to Kim (2020), the change from isolation to wilfulness may be a result of Kim 
Jong Un feeling satisfied with his nuclear developments and being ready to take on 
economic development which required much assistance and confidence from other 
states. This led to numerous diplomatic engagements with leaders from Russia, China, 
South Korea and the US in just a short stint of 18 months. In 2013, Jong Un expressed 
that only once the state is secure, then economic growth could occur. The rapid 
developments in security as a result of advanced technologies and foreign assistance 
allowed Jong Un to focus on economic development, deeply affected by sanctions.   
Once again, the US has failed in derailing North Korea’s ambitions and their new-found 
capabilities have resulted in even greater hostility in international relations. Trump’s 
reliance on Twitter diplomacy has also been of little significance in easing the tension. 
The US president even went as far as expressing his fury on Twitter for China, stating 
that the opposing superpower makes billions of dollars yearly in trade surplus but has in 
no way illustrated any action in assisting the US with North Korea, claiming China is full 
of talks (Shim Jae Hoon, 2017). Mansoor and Hussain (2017), state that the US should 
stop attempting to denuclearise North Korea and rather give diplomacy a chance to do 
its job. Hecker (2017), also shares such sentiments, highlighting that diplomacy has not 
failed but rather that the US has failed to implement diplomacy effectively. North Korea’s 
acquirement of nuclear weapons is a threat to international security. The ever-advancing 
strides made in autonomous weapons and technology that improve the speed, accuracy 
and destructibility factor of such weapons are a cause of concern that is yet to be 
legislated.  
4.7.1.1.2 Norway experiences cyberattack  
In 2020, Norway was victim to a US$10million cyberattack. According to Coble (2020), 
the cyberattack took place on 16 March  and was only detected on 30 April  after the 
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hackers attempted to fraudulently retrieve money for the second time. The attack was 
made possible by six months of online lurking by the hackers who were then able to 
falsely manipulate information and impersonate a microfinance institution which had 
received a loan from Norfund, the money was then sent to a diverted account in Mexico.  
Norfund (2020), has described the cyberattack as ‘advanced’, made possible by 
extensive digital channels. In addition, the attack was not the first for a Norwegian 
institution as other private companies have also experienced similar attacks but due to 
its advanced nature, it has gone unnoticed and therefore, unreported. In March 2019, an 
aluminium production company experienced an immense cyberattack that impacted 
production and operation and would result in weeks of recovery. The hackers requested 
large sums of money for Norsk Hydro to retrieve its information again, but the corporation 
insisted it would not pay the ransom but rather retrieve its information from its own back-
up systems. The cyberattack cost roughly US$40 million in its first week and had large 
scale financial and physical implications as it slowed down production (Adomaitis, 2019). 
4.7.1.1.3 Russia’s role in cyberwarfare  
According to Bloomberg (2018), Russia is one of the world’s ‘leading practitioners of 
cyberwarfare’, highlighting the accusations against Russia for obtruding in the 2016 US 
elections. Russia’s role in the election was an attempt to tarnish Trump’s opposing 
candidate, Hillary Clinton and assist Trump in winning the 2016 election. Abrams (2019), 
explains that Russia’s efforts were executed through hacking voter databases, campaign 
committees and further spreading false propaganda on social media to instil a sense of 
distrust in the American democracy and boost voter support for President Trump. Over 
a three-year period, during an ongoing investigation, the information surrounding 
Russia’s involvement in the 2016 US election has come to light with 12 Russian citizens 
being indicted for their role in the saga. It was also discovered that the personal 
information of roughly 500 000 American citizens was stolen. 
Ahead of the 2020 US election, Doffman (2019), predicts that Russia may pry once again. 
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has prioritised election security and 
acknowledges the potential threat of other states in the field of cybersecurity. 
Furthermore, Check Point, a cybersecurity software company that provides solutions to 
governments has warned the US of Russia’s possible intervention in the US election. 
Doffman (2019), echoes the primary concerns in Check Point’s report which highlights 
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that at the beginning of 2019, Russia invested a significant amount of money into 
espionage capabilities. Check Point believes that this investment attempts to equip 
Russia with the capabilities and potential to tarnish the 2020 US elections.  
Cyberattacks on the US by the Russians is not an exclusive incident. According to 
Brumfield (2019), Russian military group Sandworm has been creating extremely 
advanced tools for highly sophisticated and destructive cyberattacks, attacking the 
Ukraine on two separate occasions. Furthermore, as predicted, Sandworm’s efforts and 
advancements have had major spillover effects and prompted advanced attacks by other 
groups such as the 2017 attack on the US and Europe by NotPetya. Brumfield recalls 
that NotPetya’s attack was specifically destructive and wide-spanning on the Ukraine as 
it took down 300 Ukrainian government entities which included hospitals, banks and 
airports. 
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has thoroughly explored practical examples of the application of 4IR and 
the relevant technologies. Examples of state and non-state actors have been dissected. 
From the findings of this chapter, it is evident that some developing states, such as India 
and South Africa, have noted the value of 4IR and have begun integrating 4IR into their 
systems and processes.  However, 4IR has mostly been utilised in highly developed 
states that possess an abundance in AI capabilities, such as Russia and the US. States, 
such as Canada, have realised the value of research to advance the integration of 
science and technology into daily activities and to improve the delivery of services and 
performances of tasks. Over time, more application may be visible as technologies 
become more readily available and accessible to developing and developed states, as 








Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The study is underpinned by five pillars: communication, interdependence, legislation, 
new ‘new’ diplomacy and diplomatic functions. Each pillar represents a subset of 
diplomacy that may be implicated by 4IR and has been independently explored 
throughout the research. The research is guided by three research questions: 1) how 
does 4IR affect diplomacy? 2) what new technologies trigger a change in diplomacy? 
and 3) do costs act as a barrier to states? 
5.1 How does 4IR affect diplomacy?  
The dissertation has thoroughly explored diplomacy from the ancient era in Greece to 
the present. After providing a detailed conceptual framework which studies old and new 
diplomacy, it has clearly been discussed how old and new diplomacy differ and how both 
phases of diplomacy differ from the type of diplomacy that is practiced today. Although 
diplomacy remains a relevant practice, the execution has been slightly different than in 
previous decades as advanced technologies have altered how humans interact and the 
way in which services are provided. This study then proposes that we now enter a new 
phase of diplomacy: new ‘new’ diplomacy. The Table below provides a simplified 
explanation of the characteristics and nature of diplomacy in three different phases.  
Table 5: The central features of old, new, and new ‘new’ diplomacy 
 Old diplomacy New diplomacy New ‘new’ 
diplomacy 
Date  700BC-1914 1919-2020 2020-  
Nature  Closed  Open  More open 





and social media. 
Interdependence Low levels of 
interaction, 
alliances. State is 
the primary actor  
Multilateralism− 
states, non-state 












interest groups.  
Legislation Treaty of 
Westphalia of 
1648. Congress of 
Vienna of 1814. 
Vienna Convention 
of Diplomatic 
Relations of 1963. 
Vienna Convention 
of Diplomatic 
Relations of 1963− 











Functions  To represent the 
state and achieve 
the foreign policy 
goals of the state. 
To represent the 
state and achieve 
the foreign policy 
goals of the state. 
To represent the 
state and achieve 
the foreign policy 
goals of the state. 
See footnote10 
Old diplomacy began in 700BC in ancient Greece and concluded in 1914. During this 
period, diplomacy was very closed and practiced in secret as highlighted by Otte (2007), 
often made up of bilateral relations with the state being the primary actor. The birth of 
new diplomacy was simultaneous to the formation of the League of Nations in 1919 and 
it is the same type of diplomacy referred to in practice in the past decade. It is open in 
nature and occurs on a multilateral level. Geraud (1945), describes the introduction of 
international organisations into diplomatic relations as a distinctive factor of new 
diplomacy. Langhorne (2005), has categorised its introduction as a shift from exclusively 
state actors to the inclusion of non-state actors. In addition, Morgenthau (1946), 
highlights that world leaders such as Woodrow Wilson deemed international cooperation 
as a top priority in new diplomacy. At present, 4IR takes every field by storm and changes 
the way we live and work. This presents yet another shift in diplomacy, entitled new ‘new’ 
diplomacy. New ‘new’ diplomacy is even more open than the previous phase of 
 
10 Adapted from Geraud (1945); Black (2010); Eilers (2006); Otte (2007); Roberts (2009); Morgenthau (1946); 
Langhorne (2005); Manor (2017a); Bjola and Kornprobst (2018). 
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diplomacy as the range of actors has multiplied, now including the state, international 
organisations, MNCs, private corporations and citizens; as diplomacy has been taken to 
social media. 
In old diplomacy, there was very little that guided the interaction of diplomats with hardly 
any legislation in place. In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia was signed that concluded the 
end of a 30-year war which saw the death of roughly 8 million people. In 1814, the 
Congress of Vienna was an attempt by the Europeans to develop a peace plan following 
the Napoleonic and French Revolutionary wars.  In new diplomacy, the VCDR of 1961 
was formed which deals with diplomatic immunity and privileges of diplomats, heads of 
states, their family and other staff on the diplomatic mission. As discussed, the VCDR is 
extremely detailed and deals with various aspects of a diplomatic mission such as the 
protection of highly classified information and  the diplomat. However, as it stands, the 
current version of the VCDR is insufficient as it stands to guide diplomatic practice in a 
highly globalised and interconnected international environment. It is then imperative that 
the document be reviewed once again to establish how it can remain relevant and 
adequately protect diplomats, staff and their families on diplomatic missions.  
In old diplomacy, diplomacy was conducted by professional and charismatic diplomats 
who were highly knowledgeable of the state at hand. In new diplomacy, the diplomat’s 
role became slightly more complex having to be patient, courteous, be highly skilled and 
trained and speak multiple languages (Nicolson, 1998). As aforementioned, diplomats 
also have to have excellent negotiation skills and represent their state well, in addition to 
protecting citizens domestically and abroad. The main actors who may conduct 
diplomacy in new diplomacy include the state and international organisations However, 
as technology becomes to mean more in diplomacy, diplomats have to now have the 
ability of understanding and interpreting AI algorithms and be extremely familiar with how 
to use social media. Therefore, diplomats will have to undergo extensive training ahead 
of their deployment. The actors involved in new ‘new’ diplomacy range from the state, 
international organisations, citizens, MNCs and interest groups.  
Lastly, from the findings of this study, it is evident that the utmost primary function in all 
three phases of diplomacy remains identical and that is to represent the state and 
achieve the foreign policy goals set out by the state. This is irrespective of how such 
goals and objectives may be achieved.  
96 
 
5.1.1 Communication  
The communication pillar has extensively explored digital diplomacy and the use of social 
media for diplomatic practice. In addition, it has explored the positive and negative 
implications of AI in diplomacy, looking at deep-fakes and sentiment analysis. Over the 
past decade, we have witnessed a steady rise of digital diplomacy (Manor, 2017; 
Verrekia, 2017). The growing accessibility of advanced technologies and the internet has 
diminished territorial borders and opened up a greater space for communication.  
Digitised diplomatic practice is cost-efficient and offers real-time communication, different 
to delayed communication in old diplomacy and in some ways, faster than new diplomacy 
too. Fisher (2013), credits advanced ICT infrastructure for a faster and more efficient 
diplomacy. However, the instantaneous nature of the internet drastically decreases the 
time a state has to respond to conflict or crises in foreign media.  
Digital diplomacy allows audiences to witness states engage in real-time on social media. 
In addition, Evans and Commins (2017), highlight that social media allows movements 
to quickly gain momentum and sweep the globe in a matter of hours or days. This may 
result in state leaders experiencing significant pressure if they do or do not pledge 
support to the movement, as illustrated in the 2020 Black Lives Matter movement.  
Due to the wide and open conversational spaces, states can have a greater sense of 
public openness. Hocking and Mellissen (2015), believe that this may allow for a more 
inclusive public policymaking process. In addition, McLellan (2017), highlights that 
sentiment analysis also provides states the platform to have a more in-depth 
understanding of public opinion. The benefit of sentiment analysis is that it explores real-
time data providing real-time results which is crucial in times of specific events, such as 
movements or during election periods.  
Digital propaganda has also been discussed in great detail highlighting the sentiment of 
Briant and Wanless (2018), who state that technological advances may advance the face 
of traditional propaganda, moving from newspapers and radio sources to social media 
and deep-fakes through advanced AI. The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (2019), 
has described deep-fakes as purposefully manipulated audio or visual content to falsely 
distort public opinion. Nicolson (1998), very early on predicted the fate of wireless 
propaganda. Deep-fakes are becoming more highly advanced and increasingly difficult 
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to detect. According to Westerland (2019), this poses a significant threat to international 
security and international relations.  
The last subsection of digital diplomacy that has been explored is that of hashtag 
diplomacy which has become increasingly popular in the last five years. Manor (nd), has 
described the use of hashtag diplomacy as an attempt by government or non-state actors 
to build their public image. Chapter 4 explored President Trump’s fondness for hashtags 
over the last four years, such as #MAGA.  
5.1.2 Interdependence 
The interdependence pillar explores international collaboration and cooperation, 
specifically in the field of science and technology diplomacy. As stated, Hennessy (2019), 
describes science diplomacy as the scientific collaborative efforts among states. Three 
subsets of science diplomacy were explored: science for diplomacy, science in 
diplomacy and diplomacy for science.  
The intersection of science and diplomacy is not a new phenomenon but may be 
populated in the era of 4IR. Cunningham (2003) has claimed that science and diplomacy 
are becoming a central feature of international negotiations. Of late, we have witnessed 
science and technology become more cemented in diplomatic relations, especially on a 
multilateral platform. The study has explored the numerous multilateral meetings to 
discuss 4IR and international cooperation to smoothly integrate the latest revolution into 
economies around the world and achieve endless possibilities.  
To recap, Van Langenhove (2019), describes the varieties of science diplomacy as 
follows: 
Science for Diplomacy Science and technology are utilised as a 
diplomatic tool to improve foreign 
relations between states in the efforts to 
collaborate against cross-border issues.  
Diplomacy for Science  Traditional diplomatic tools are utilised in 
an attempt to equip the state with the 
knowledge of foreign sciences and 
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technology to improve national 
capabilities.  
Science in Diplomacy With the input and interests of scientists 
on foreign policy, it may enhance foreign 
policy actions and responses in times of 
war or peace.  
(Van Langenhove, 2019) 
Each variety has been thoroughly dealt with. In the exploration of science for diplomacy, 
Graham (2017), explores the use of big data in Africa to gather large inputs of information 
on health and disease on previous outbreaks. In doing so, West African countries have 
studied the patterns, routes and time it takes for diseases and viruses to spread, to limit 
future impacts.  
The UN (2020), also states that with big data and PPPs, the SDGs may be achieved. For 
example, deforestation can be closely observed and tracked with ‘satellite imagery, 
crowd-sourced witness accounts and open data’ (Global Pulse, 2017).  
In the subset of diplomacy for science, the Royal Society (2010), states that ‘science 
offers the opportunity to bridge the gap between states that have previously weaker 
political association’. As science becomes a greater part of our world and indefinitely 
cannot be avoided, this presents an opportunity to states to come forth and collaborate. 
In addition, from scientific cooperation, other political relations may strengthen between 
the two states. Mann (2019), details the Large Hydron Collider project that consisted of 
roughly 8 000 researchers from over 60 countries that came together to create a powerful 
and ground-breaking accelerator.  
The third and final variety, science in diplomacy, is the most comprehensive of them all. 
It encompasses new institutions, educational opportunities, track-two diplomacy, 
cooperation agreements and international science exhibitions (Royal Society, 2010). 
New institutions are extremely popular during the era of 4IR. The Centre for the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution is an example of new institutions. According to the WEF (2020), 
global centres around the world are being set up in major cities to understand how new 
technologies can be utilised in different parts of society and realise the maximum 
potential of 4IR.  
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For the future of diplomacy to remain relevant and secure, there are a number of steps 
that can be taken by states and organisations. First, states should work closely with one 
another, technology developers, scientists and researchers to reduce the risk of the state 
being vulnerable to attack by external parties who have access to newly advanced and 
destructive technology. Second, while the use of social media for diplomatic 
communication, between states and with citizens, is encouraged there should be a 
framework that guides virtual interactions. This may ensure that there is not an overshare 
of information or inappropriate display of interaction or remarks that may negatively 
impact the state or state officials. Lastly, the VCDR of 1961 should be updated to remain 
relevant. Although the responsibilities and tasks of a diplomat and the state remain the 
same for the most part, the way in which tasks are performed may be slightly different 
and influenced by technology, such as the introduction of the virtual embassy and 
interaction via e-mail. In addition, the protection of national and international security in 
a highly digitised and interconnected world should be dealt with in great detail to maintain 
peace and security in the international society as the VCDR of 1961 sets out to do.   
5.1.3 Domestic and international legal frameworks 
The only official document that exclusively guides diplomatic practice is the VCDR of 
1961. However, since its formation it has never been updated to reflect current trends in 
diplomatic practice. Edelman (2020), states that it is important to regulate AI but it cannot 
adopt a one-size-fits-all approach due to the complexity and diversity of technology. 
Therefore, regulation ought to be extremely specific and agile. In addition, AI technology 
is continuously developing and therefore may not be fully legislated until it is completely 
developed (Michaelsons, nd).  
States have been working on AI integration into military services. Russia has built robotic 
soldiers with the intent of replacing human soldiers (Spry, 2020). Although such projects 
are highly sophisticated, it is not yet perfect and is yet to be regulated. Garcia (2018), 
explains the threat of militarised AI to international security and stability. From the 
findings of this dissertation, it has been established that AI cannot be utilised or trusted 
if it operates independently but rather it requires human input and strict regulation.  
Wouters and Duqet (2012), explain that the VCDR of 1961 does not include non-state 
actors. This is problematic as non-state actors have come to play a greater role in 
diplomatic relations and therefore it needs to be updated. In addition, one of the key 
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drivers of the VCDR is to preserve and maintain international security. However, this is 
difficult as the nature of security continues to change and what was deemed as secure 
10 years ago or even five months ago, may not be considered secure in the current 
spectrum.  
Communication is also an important element of diplomatic relations and made mention 
of in Article 27 of the VCDR. However, forms of communication have drastically evolved 
since 1961 and transcends to the use of social media and platforms like Skype, 
WhatsApp and Twitter. Therefore, how is information protected on such platforms? In 
addition, it ought to be established if coding and ciphering for the protection of information 
may still be relevant irrespective of the forms it may take.  
Lastly, permanent missions such as embassies are also a crucial part of diplomacy. This 
dissertation has explored the rise of virtual embassies in smaller regions to ensure that 
citizens have instant access to e-services. However, it must be established if a virtual 
embassy can fully replace a physical embassy and provide all the relevant services. This 
may be explored in future studies.  
5.1.4 New ‘new’ diplomacy 
The section on new ‘new’ diplomacy explored virtual and e-diplomacy which have 
become increasingly popular in the last five years. Virtual diplomacy deals with VPPs 
and virtual embassies. Nielsen (2007),  cited 41 VPPs at the time of writing. It is possible 
that this has drastically increased over time and will continue to do so in the foreseeable 
future.  
The integration of ICTs has allowed for horizontal engagements between states and 
citizens, allowing for open conversations and better understanding of public opinion. This 
dissertation has explored the threat of internet censorship which may deter horizontal 
engagements. Fassihi (2019), describes internet censorship as a common practice in 
Iran.  
E-diplomacy is continuously evolving due to rapid advances in technologies. 4IR is a 
definite influencer as it contributes to a diversifying diplomatic practice. E-diplomacy may 
assist with engagement between states and citizens, enhanced public diplomacy and 
more accurate and faster decision-making processes. 
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Al-Mustfah (2018), states that secrecy, resistance to change and financial capabilities 
may hinder the implementation of e-diplomacy. However, Tavares (2018), explains that 
e-diplomacy is cost-effective and agile.  
5.1.5 Diplomatic functions  
Cyber diplomacy and the role of a diplomat have been explored in detail. According to 
Barrinha and Renard (2017), cyber diplomacy is the use of diplomatic tools and cyber 
resources to achieve foreign policy goals. Buck (1998), classifies cyberspace as a ‘global 
common’ similar to the high seas. Issues relating to diplomacy and the cyber domain 
include, but are not limited to, cybercrime and security, internet freedom and governance.  
In addition, over the last few years cyberattacks on states and organisations have 
become popular but it remains difficult to regulate the use of AI, ICT and big data.  
The scope of activities of a diplomat have drastically widened, despite their overall role 
remaining the same and that is to represent the interests of the state. The influence of 
technology has had a significant impact on a diplomat’s role. Al-Alawi (2019), states that 
diplomats ought to undergo extensive training to keep up to date with the latest 
technological inputs. In addition, Grottola (2018), explains that diplomats may use AI for 
negotiation processes. Organisations such as Swissnex Network (2020), have played a 
central role in offering skills training to diplomats allowing them to stay abreast of the 
latest trends. Despite the new skills required by a diplomat and the new activities that 
ought to be performed, diplomats still have to be patient, charismatic and endearing.  
5.2 What new technologies trigger a change in diplomacy? 
4IR consists of a vast array of technologies. Most of the technologies are not new but 
due to recent advancements, the possibilities have multiplied and intensified. 
Technologies specific to diplomacy and that of this study that have been explored include 
AI, big data and ICT. From the findings of this study, it is evident that AI and ICT are the 
most impactful technologies on diplomacy. This may be due to their wide-spanning 
nature as each encompass a range of applications and abilities. 
5.2.1 AI  
AI is very complex and extremely multifaceted. It can be applied in a variety of ways to 
stimulate a desired outcome. A variety of systems are geared or processed through AI. 
This dissertation has explored sentiment analysis, a form of social media analytics that 
judges human opinions and attitudes in relation to a particular topic. McLellan (2015), 
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states that sentiment analysis can be done on Twitter as the application has volume, 
velocity and variety. This assists states in understanding domestic and foreign public 
opinion. The process of sentiment analysis is extremely efficient and detailed.  
While the dissertation has extensively explored the positive implications of 4IR, it also 
explored the negative implications like the rise of deep-fakes. As discussed, the 
purposefully manipulated audio or visual content is designed to sway public opinion and 
tarnish the image of an individual, state or organisation. It is becoming increasingly 
advanced, difficult to detect and potentially damaging on diplomatic relations and the 
public diplomacy efforts of a state.  
Instant language translation is used for governments to understand a wider audience on 
social media. It may also be utilised to limit the language barrier between diplomats or 
heads of states at diplomatic meetings. However, although this may improve the 
understanding between two or more parties, it may take away from the personal element 
of diplomacy.  
Hashtag diplomacy has also been explored and it is powered by AI algorithmic processes 
that group specific topics together. It assists states or individuals in illustrating their 
stance on a particular topic and helps movements gain momentum.  
5.2.2 Big data  
Big data is an extremely useful tool and may also be utilised in a number of ways. 
Hashem et al., (2015) explain that big data uses structured or unstructured dataset inputs 
to ‘capture, process and reveal insights in a timely way’. It aids in decision-making, 
allowing such processes to be faster, more efficient and accurate. Hocking and Mellissen 
(2015), also state that big data allows for a more accurate delivery of information and 
services. As highlighted by Global Pulse (2019), it can assist with deforestation and limit 
the impact of climate change.  
5.2.3 ICT   
ICT also plays a substantive role in the evolving nature of diplomacy as communication 
is a central feature of diplomatic practice. Fisher (2013), described ICT as one of the 
primary influences in improving the speed and efficiency of diplomacy.  
Adesina (2017), states that ICT alters the forms of communication, allows for unmediated 
and open conversations; and stimulates direct engagement between states and citizens. 
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The dissertation has explored numerous examples of this, illustrating how digital 
diplomacy has been popularised through the use of ICT.  
The open and continuous dialogue, also termed as horizontal engagement, between 
states has allowed for citizens to have direct access to diplomats and heads of states 
where they can openly state their concerns or ask questions. As a result, this has boosted 
the confidence of citizens in their government as well as assisting with trust-building 
between the two (Bekenova and Collins, 2019; Bousfield, 2019).  
In the past decade, governments across the world have made a tremendous effort in 
increasing their social media presence and building their online image. Verrekia (2017), 
discusses the US DoS’s close observance of Twitter feeds. In addition, the US 
government has utilised language translation applications to understand the concerns 
and opinions of a wider international audience. Governments have also utilised ICT in 
VPPs to provide diplomatic e-services to citizens who cannot access physical 
embassies.  
The advances of ICT do not only positively implicate the line of communication between 
states and citizens but also between states exclusively. Ehiane and Mosud (2013), 
explain that improved communication between states may result in improved diplomatic 
relations between states. This is especially relevant to states who were previously hostile 
or in times of crises, as explored in chapter 4 in relation to Iran and the US solving their 
dispute on Twitter.  
Wenyan (2018), highlights that the accessibility and cost-efficiency of new and advanced 
ICT infrastructure may improve communication in developing countries and expand their 
reach in international society. Anderson (2014), further highlights that it may enhance 
regional security and possibly limit the chance of terrorism.  
5.3 Do costs act as a barrier to states? 
Yes and no.  
New technologies are costly, and some developing states still lack adequate ICT 
infrastructure and financial capabilities to stay abreast of the latest technological trends. 
However, Kedia (2018), states that 4IR presents an opportunity for developing states to 
skip stages of industrialisation that were perhaps missed in previous industrial 
revolutions. Innovation is a key element in reaping the full or maximum benefits of 4IR. 
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Brynjolfsson, McAfee and Spence (2014), highlight that the states who are able to 
produce innovative ideas will benefit from 4IR, despite their financial positions.  
Schwab (2016a), also discusses the potential of 4IR to empower individuals in a political, 
economic and social development sense but it also has the power to widen the scales of 
inequality and further marginalise groups of society or states as a whole. Therefore, the 
response of states will be imperative to determine if they will fly or fall in the era of 4IR 
(Poro, 2017).  
The WEF has also been exploring the potential of states, developed and developing, to 
determine if it is an appropriate environment for 4IR to flourish. Ariffen (2018), echoes 
the accomplishments and characteristics of India which led to it being earmarked by the 
WEF. This has resulted in a Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution being set up in 
the country.  
According to Al-Mustfah et al., (2018), financial capabilities may hinder a state’s ability 
to implement e-diplomacy. This may result in states not engaging, fully or partially, in 
diplomatic practice due to a lack of funds. It may further hinder a state’s attempt at public 
diplomacy as technology plays such a central role in the current trends of public 
diplomacy.  
Despite a country’s readiness and approach to 4IR, collaboration is also a vital element. 
South Korea and India have signed a joint-cooperation agreement  for the advancement 
of 4IR in the respective states (Herh, 2018). India and the US have also committed to 
increase their collaborative efforts in the fields of science, technology and innovation (US 
DoS, 2019). China has also illustrated a strong willingness to assist developing countries, 
especially African countries (Wu, 2019). However, China’s efforts are no surprise after 
President Xi JinPing emphasised the importance of multilateralism and operating with a 
sense of openness in the international economy rather than in isolation (Nan, 2019). 
Mairisi and van Dyk (2019), also highlight the need for international collaboration 
exploring South Africa’s readiness, or lack thereof, for 4IR.  
It is possible that no state possesses all the innovative ideas and financial capabilities 
required to reap the benefits of 4IR. Some states may possess the financial capabilities 
required to purchase and invest in new technologies while other states may have no 
funds but may possess innovative researchers and skilled individuals with unlimited 
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potential to grasp the 4IR. Therefore, partnerships and collaboration are crucial (Leurant 
and Aurik, 2018).  
5.4 Recommendations for future study  
As the phenomenon of 4IR and its intersection with diplomacy is a relatively new and 
unexplored topic, this study may be utilised as a foundation and future research may be 
built on from here.  
The field of diplomacy is extremely vast which resulted in this study being rather 
extensive. The study explored five pillars of diplomacy but due to the level of study, it 
does not go into extensive detail. Therefore, it is possible that each pillar may be a stand-
alone study, allowing the researcher to explore the implications of 4IR on a particular 
pillar in great detail.  
4IR is vast and encompasses many different aspects of technologies and applications. 
Therefore, future study may explore specific aspects of 4IR in relation to specific aspects 
of diplomacy, for example: the implications of sentiment analysis on public diplomacy.  
Future studies may also take a case study approach that may provide a more practical 
understanding of 4IR. However, comparative case study analysis is recommended over 
a single case study to avoid generalisation or to ignore certain aspects that may influence 
the study such as the GDP of a state, poverty, educational levels and so forth.  
It is also recommended that ahead of selecting the research topic, extensive exploration 
is completed on the research questions to ensure that there is an adequate amount of 
reputable and academic sources, specifically academic books and journal articles. 
Positively, new sources are constantly published as new information is being discovered 
and patterns are developed.  
Future researchers should conduct interviews with academics, analysts and state 
officials that are well-informed on the topic at hand and have extensive experience in the 
field. Due to the newness of this field, interviews may prove to be invaluable. Although 
this study has been approved for interviews, in the end none were conducted as the 
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